State of Utah v. Robert Brian Pedockie : Brief of Petitioner by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2004
State of Utah v. Robert Brian Pedockie : Brief of
Petitioner
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Sharon Preston; attorney for respondent.
Kris C. Leonard; assistant attorney general; Mark Shurtleff; attorney general; attorneys for petitioner.
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Utah v. Pedockie, No. 20040746.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2541
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
ROBERT BRIAN PEDOCKIE, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
CaseNo.20040746-SC 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 







SHARON PRESTON (7960) 
716 East 4500 South, Suite N142 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 269-9541 
KRIS C. LEONARD (4902) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney GeneraL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P O BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Facsimile: (801)366-0167 
Attorney for Respondent Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
ROBERT BRIAN PEDOCKIE, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20040746-SC 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHARON PRESTON (7960) 
716 East 4500 South, Suite N142 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 269-9541 
KRIS C. LEONARD (4902) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney GeneraL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P O BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Facsimile: (801)366-0167 
Attorney for Respondent Attorneys for Petitioner 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 13 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 14 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S PERSISTENT DILATORY CONDUCT OVER A 
PROLONGED PERIOD, DESPITE THE TRIAL COURT'S WARNINGS AND 
EFFORTS TO ACCOMMODATE HIS REQUEST FOR COUNSEL, 
IMPLIEDLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, AND DE NOVO 
REVIEW OF THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT THE WAIVER WAS 
KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT 17 
A. WHERE WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS BASED ON 
DEFENDANT'S DILATORY CONDUCT AND NO COLLOQUY WAS 
CONDUCTED, DE NOVO REVIEW OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL IS 
NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE WAIVER 19 
B. A DE NOVO REVIEW OF THE RECORD REVEALS THAT THE 
IMPLIED WAIVER BY CONDUCT WAS KNOWING AND 
INTELLIGENT 27 
1. The record demonstrates a knowing and intelligent waiver by conduct.... 28 
2. Defendant's dilatory conduct and his ability to retain counsel establish 
the functional equivalent of a knowing and intentional waiver 36 
i 
2. Defendant's dilatory conduct and his ability to retain counsel establish 
the functional equivalent of a knowing and intentional waiver 36 
CONCLUSION 50 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - State v. Pedockie, 2004 UT App 224, 95 P.3d 1182 
Addendum B - U.S. Const, amend. VI 
Addendum C - Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999) 
Addendum D - Transcript (R. 476:30-45) 
(discussion of speedy trial motion and procedural history) 
Addendum E - Transcript (R. 459:1 -20) 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) 21, 22, 26 
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) 40 
Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d753 (5th Cir. 1984) 26 
State v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1983) 25, 36, 40 
United States v.Arlen, 252 F.2d 491 (2nd Cir. 1958) 37 
United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.), 
cert denied, 506 U.S. 882 (1992) 26, 37, 48 
United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1989) 38,40, 48 
United States v. Gates, 557 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1977), 
cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1017(1978) 37 
United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092 (5th Cir. 1995) 20, 21 
United States v. Hughes, 191 F.3d 1317 (10th Cir. 1999), 
cert denied, 529 U.S.1022 (2000) 19, 20, 21 
United States v. Kelm, 827F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1987) 24,49 
United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237 (3rd Cir. 1998), 
cert denied, 528 U.S. 868 (1999) 20 
United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322 (11th Cir. 1995) 20 
United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1987) 25 
United States v. Weninger, 624F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1980) 24, 40 
United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1991), 
cert denied, 502 U.S. 1106 (1992) 22, 23 
Wheatv. United States, 486 U.S. 153(1988) 40 
iii 
STATE CASES 
Brickert v. State, 673 N.E.2d 493 (Ind. App 1997), 
reh'g denied (Veb.20, 1997) 23, 25, 36, 37, 38, 40 
Colbert v. State, 714 P.2d 209 (Ok. Cr. App. 1986) 23, 38 
Cummings v. Newton, 546 N.W.2d 406 (Wis. 1996) 22, 23, 24, 25, 27 
Kingv. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 585 (Cal. App 3rd Dist 2003) 22 
People v. Friedman, 403 N.E.2d 229 (111. 1980) 25 
People v. Williams, 440 N.E.2d 843 (111. 1982) 25,37 
Siniardv. State, 491 So. 2d 1062 (Al. Cr. App 1986) 25, 37 
State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 979 P.2d 799, 
reh'g denied (Jim 16, 1999) 17,20,28 
State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987) 17, 18, 19 
State v. Hassan, 2004 UT 99, 514 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 
reh'g denied (Dec. 14,2004) 18, 19,20 
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998) 2, 18 
State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, 65 P.3d 1180 2 
State v. Montgomery, 530 S.E.2d 66 (N.C. 2000) 20 
State v. Pedockie, 2004 UT App 224, 95 P.3d 1182 2, 17, 18, 28, 52 
State v. Schmick, 660 P.2d 693 (Or. App. 1983) 38 
State v. Tarumoto, 614 P.2d 397 (Ha. 1980) 22, 37 
State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, 57P.3d 1052 2 
State v. Vancleave, 2001 UT App 228, 29 P.3d 680, 
cert, denied, 40 P.3d 1135 (Utah 2001) 2 
iv 
State v. Woods, 424 N.W.2d 730 (Wis. App 1988) 23 
Tyler v. State, 581 S.W.2d328 (Ark. 1979) 22 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999) 2,, 35, 52 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (West 2004) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (West 2004) 1 
LaFavre, Israel & King,, Criminal Procedure, §11.3 (2d ed. 1999) 20, 21, 23 
v 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
ROBERT BRIAN PEDOCKIE, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
CaseNo.20040746-SC 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON CERTIORARI REVIEW 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari to review the court of 
appeals' decision in State v. Pedockie, 2004 UT App. 224, 95 P.3d 1182 (a copy of the court 
of appeals' decision is attached in Addendum A). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. A. Did defendant's persistent dilatory conduct over a prolonged period constitute 
an implied waiver of his right to counsel where the trial judge provided ample warnings and 
made every effort to accommodate defendant's invocation of his right to counsel? 
B. Did defendant's conduct establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right 
to counsel where he repeatedly invoked the right while consistently and repeatedly refusing 
to cooperate with multiple appointed and retained counsel, appeared at his fifth trial setting 
without retained counsel despite numerous warnings that such action would result in self 
representation, and engaged in multiple efforts to frustrate any trial? 
"On certiorari review 'we review the court of appeals' decision, not the opinion of the 
[trial] court.' State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, \ 10,458 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. That decision is then 
reviewed for correctness. Id." State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, ^  7,65 P.3d 1180; State v. 
7rane, 2002 UT 97416,57P.3d 1052. "Whether a waiver of counsel was made knowingly 
and intelligently is a mixed question of law and fact. [This Court] reviewfs] the trial court's 
legal determinations for correctness." State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911,914 (Utah 1998). The 
trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. See State v. Vancleave, 2001 UT 
App 228, If 5, 29 P.3d 680, cert, denied, 40 P.3d 1135 (Utah 2001). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is relevant to the issues on 
appeal and is attached in Addendum B. Defendant preserved no state constitutional claim 
for appeal. See State v. Pedockie, 2004 UT App. 224,130, 95 P.3d 1182 n.5. Add. A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999) (in Addendum C). Defendant adamantly refused to 
represent himself and insisted over the course of twenty-one months that he wanted counsel. 
Eventually, defendant had multiple appointed counsel, multiple retained counsel, standby 
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counsel, four trial continuances, more than twenty-one months to prepare, and multiple 
warnings from the trial judge in at least seven hearings that if he did not follow counsels' 
advice he would go to trial representing himself. After ample warning that he would 
represent himself if he appeared at his fifth trial setting without counsel, defendant appeared 
without counsel, insisted that standby counsel be dismissed, and went to trial representing 
himself, all the while repeatedly insisting that he wanted counsel and that he was not 
relinquishing his right to counsel.1 
At his initial appearance on February 20,2001, defendant was found indigent, and the 
court appointed the Weber County Public Defenders Office ["PDA"] to represent him 
(Rl3-14,259,279; R463:2). Defendant's first attorney, Mr. Bouwhuis, asked to be released 
because of an unidentified conflict (R474:13; R476:3; R477:5). 
On April 10, 2001, the assigned judge recused herself and transferred the case to a 
new judge to schedule the preliminary hearing (R17-18; R463:6). In addition, defendant 
filed a pro se request for disposition of charges pursuant to the speedy trial statute (R17,23-
25). See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (West 2004). 
Mr. Boyle was defendant's second PDA attorney and represented defendant at the 
preliminary hearing (R13-14; R26-28; R463:3; R465: passim). The trial judge bound 
defendant over as charged and set trial for August 13,2001 (R465:142-45). Defendant had 
because review turns on defendant's conduct below throughout the lengthy pre-
trial proceedings, the State presents the procedural information in some detail and 
includes additional detail in the Argument in subsection B, infra. 
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prepared a pro se discovery motion and a "motion of dismissal/' the latter alleging that "they 
violated my due process and a few of my rights" (R465:145-46). The court attempted to set 
it on the criminal law calendar, but defendant wanted more than thirty minutes to present the 
motion and insisted on signing it with his counsel (R465:146-50). 
Defendant did not file the motion to dismiss after the hearing (R31). Instead, eight 
working days before the Monday trial, and over the prosecutor's objection, defendant sought 
and received a continuance of the trial to December 10 (R40; R466:5-7,21,24). Mr. Boyle 
needed time to address several motions and to conduct additional investigation (R463:8-9). 
Prior to October 30, 2001, Mr. Boyle's contract with Weber County was terminated, 
and Mr. Retallick assumed representation of defendant as his third PDA attorney (R53, 
82-83; R467:3; R468:4). On October 25, defendant wrote to the judge complaining that Mr. 
Boyle did not file any of defendant's motions and seeking to discuss allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct with the court (R53). 
At a Ramirez hearing on November 29, the prosecutor sought the only continuance 
of the trial date she would request in this case, citing a trial in another murder case predating 
this one with an in-custody defendant (R467:128-29). The trial court granted the 
continuance, finding good cause existed for it, and set the trial a third time, moving it to 
February 4,2002 (R467:132-34). Defendant took the opportunity to again complain that that 
counsel had not filed his motiong (R467:125,128). The court advised defendant that his pro 
se filings were causing problems and that he needed to file through his attorney (R467:149). 
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Mr. Retallick continued to represent defendant until a conflict arose over defendant's 
motions (R468: 2). At a pretrial hearing on January 9,2002, Mr. Retallick stated: 
Your Honor, I believe there's a conflict of interest. Mr. Pedockie's 
requested that I file motions in - - specific motions. He gave me a list of five. 
I indicated to him that there was one that might have justification to be filed 
but that I refused to file the others. He's indicated that because of that, because 
of my refusal to file - -1 have an ethical obligation to my client but I also have 
an ethical obligation to the Court not to file what I believe to be absolutely 
frivolous motions, and so I refused to do that. And so he's wished - - he 
requested that I be terminated from the case as his attorney. So at this point in 
time I'm going to move that public defenders be released in representation of 
Mr. Pedockie on this matter. 
(R468:2). In a subsequently-filed affidavit explaining this conflict, Mr. Retallick wrote, "Mr. 
Pedockie was difficult to work with. He repeatedly requested the filing of frivolous motions 
and made outlandish, unfounded accusations about the prosecutor, judge and myself (R3 80). 
At the January 9 hearing, defendant sought appointment of a new attorney to "submit 
the motions that I would ask for because that is my right" (R468:2-3,5-8,11). The trial court 
explained that defendant could not "pick and choose" among the public defenders (R468:3), 
and that if defendant refused to accept the advice of his appointed attorney, he could either 
"represent [himjself or get [his] own attorney" (R468:5, 9,11-12). The court explained that 
it would not force Mr. Retallick to file motions that he believed were frivolous and invited 
defendant to file them pro se (R468:5,6,ll). Defendant refused and insisted that he be 
appointed as co-counsel so he could sign the motions with his attorney (R468:7,17). 
Defendant ultimately chose to stay with Mr. Retallick but wanted it on record that he had not 
filed "at least . . . seven motions" (R468:7-9). Out of concern for the record, he listed his 
5 
motions, which included a motion to dismiss for violation of his statutory speedy trial right, 
and motions involving prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, the need 
for a physical line-up, and a change of venue {see note 5, infra). 
Nine days later—and ten working days before trial—the court received a letter from 
defendant formally firing Mr. Retallick (Rl 17). The court allowed PDA to withdraw at the 
January 23 hearing, and defendant claimed that he had retained Ed Brass as his fourth 
attorney (Rl 18-19; R.469:2-4). 
One week later—three working days before trial—Scott Williams appeared on behalf 
of Mr. Brass, and, with defendant's express consent, continued the trial to April 15 
(Rl 18,122-23,130; R463:12-14). Mr. Brass represented defendant for about two months 
without incident, appearing at the April 10 pre-trial conference with no sign of any problem 
(R130,147,165,167; R470: passim; R471:2). Then, in aphone conference on April 12—one 
working day before trial—Mr. Brass told the court that his "interests may conflict with 
[defendant's] in this case. And there's really no way that I can proceed to be his attorney" 
(R184-85,190-91,330-31; R471:2-15). This conflict apparently arose because defendant 
again wanted his counsel to file motions that counsel felt were frivolous (R471:9; R473:2,5-
6,9-11,14; R477:5-6). 
Defendant again rejected appointed counsel, Mr. Brass offered to help defendant 
retain new counsel and report back to the court (Rl 84; R471:2-3, 15-17). The trial court 
then cautioned defendant, "I want Mr. Pedockie to understand, I'm not gonna continue this 
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case again, Mr. Pedockie. I don't care [what] your excuse or reason is, you either get an 
attorney who will represent you on the matter or you're just gonna represent yourself next 
time it's scheduled" (Rl 84; R471:15). Defendant said that he understood that he had to get 
a lawyer to represent him or he would have to represent himself (R471:16). 
Mr. Caine appeared at the next hearing as attorney number five for defendant and 
stated that he believed defendant was trying to retain counsel, and that he "certainly has 
significant resources to hire private counsel and that's what he wants to do. He doesn't want 
the public defender to enter in this case" (R472:2). Defendant said he was trying to hire 
Sheldon Carter, complained that he had "a problem about" the prosecutor, and once more 
objected to the court's ruling on his 120-day disposition request months earlier (R472:3-6). 
The court continued the case until May 29 at defendant's request to accommodate Mr. 
Carter's schedule, warning defendant, "you need to have an attorney here though on that 
date"(R222-23;R472:7). 
Defendant appeared on May 29 without counsel (R229-230; R 473:2). He stated that 
all the attorneys he had contacted believed it was unethical to file the motions that he had 
(R473:2). Defendant repeatedly demanded an in camera hearing to discuss prosecutorial 
misconduct and insisted that his motions were "crucial" and had to be filed (R473:2-7,l 1-
12,14,24,32). At the same time, defendant balked whenever the trial judge stated that he 
could file the motions himself (R473:6-7,l 1-12). 
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The trial judge believed that defendant was trying to "hold the system captive" and 
warned defendant at least six times at this hearing alone that the matter would be set for trial 
and that defendant would need to get a lawyer or go forward representing himself (R473:4, 
6-7,10,20-21,29). He explained that attorneys kept withdrawing due to defendant's 
insistence that they "do something that's unethical" and that the problem would continue 
unless defendant started following counsel's advice (R473:15-18). Defendant wanted to talk 
with PDA, but at the same time wanted nothing to do with them (R473:17-18). He ultimately 
refused PDA's help, explaining that they could not represent him because they were not 
entirely supportive of his position (R473: 19). When PDA was offered as stand-by counsel, 
defendant agreed with the understanding that he would continue looking to retain counsel (R 
473:20). He also repeatedly insisted the motions be filed before trial (R473:17-18,23-24). 
Ultimately, the judge opined (R473: 20-21): 
Well, what I want you to understand, Mr. Pedockie, is I'm going to 
schedule this for trial. I don't care if you show up by yourself, with a public 
defender, or a private attorney. We're going to trial on this case. You're not 
going to hold the system hostage any longer. Okay? That's what this all 
amounts to. I'm not going to sit around waiting for you to decide who you 
want to represent you. We're going to schedule this for trial. . . . If you 
contact an attorney and he wants to represent you, fine. But he's not going to 
come in here and tell me, Judge, I can't make that trial date. We're going to 
trial on this case, one way or the other.. . . You can file all the motions you 
want, but I'm going to give you a trial date . . . and we're going to move 
backwards from that date. 
The judge set the trial date for the fifth and final time to start on September 30,2002, 
giving defendant a full month to file his motions (R473:25-26,33). When defendant asked 
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what would happen if he could not get someone to file his motions timely, the judge 
explained that standby counsel would help, but defendant was "lead counsel" (R473:27-28). 
Defendant insisted he could not represent himself, and the court reiterated that he could hire 
anyone he wished but that the deadlines would not be changed (R473:28-29). Defendant 
continued to complain, the judge repeated his explanations, and a PDA attorney explained 
to defendant how to present his issues to his standby counsel (R 473:28-31). Defendant filed 
three motions, pro se, on July 5 (R241-54). 
On June 13,2002, Paul Grant entered an appearance as defendant's sixth counsel (R. 
232-235). However, on July 5, 2002, before appearing in court, Mr. Grant moved to 
withdraw, claiming that defendant no longer wanted him to be counsel of record (R23 8-239). 
The trial court approved the withdrawal (R240). 
When defendant appeared at the July 31 motion hearing, he initially stated that he 
wanted to wait for his attorney, Mr. Grant, despite having received a copy of Mr. Grant's 
withdrawal motion noting that he had been fired (R474:2). Defendant claimed that he did not 
fire Mr. Grant and that he did not know if Mr. Grant was still representing him (R474:2-3,6-
7). Defendant stated that if he had known his attorney would not appear on his behalf, he 
would have gotten another one, insisting that an attorney was necessary to handle his other 
motions, "paperwork" and evidence, and that an in camera hearing before a different judge 
was necessary (R474:3-5,7-8,11,14,24). Predictably, defendant demanded new counsel but 
refused PDA (R300-01; R474:8-9,ll-13). The judge again explained the pattern of 
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defendant's conduct and the reason defendant could not keep counsel and gave defendant the 
choice of appointed or retained counsel or self-representation (R474:8-13). Defendant 
accepted a public defender, and Martin Gravis became defendant's seventh counsel (R475:3). 
The trial judge explained to him that he was standby counsel until such time as defendant 
decided that he would follow counsel's advice (R300-01; R474:13; R475:3). 
At the subsequent motion hearing, defendant complained that standby counsel would 
not argue his motions, refused to argue them himself, and repeatedly invoked his right to 
counsel for the hearing (R476:2-5,7,8,10-11,13,18). The judge again explained the need for 
defendant to listen to counsel's advice, that defendant could retain anyone he wanted, that 
new counsel could file or re-file any motions, but that trial would not be continued (R476:3-
8,18-19,21). Defendant attempted to avoid arguing his motions, offering to hire an attorney 
by the hour to do it, seeking to take his claim for an attorney to a different court, and agreeing 
to listen to any attorney if that attorney would argue his motions (R476:9-10). Defendant only 
argued his motions upon being assured that the record reflected his invocation of his right 
to counsel (R476:10-13). Before denying each motion, the judge explained why the issues 
were premature or irrelevant (R304-05,321-34; R476:20-21,23-28,30,40). He also recited 
the procedural history of the case in detail (R304-05,321-34; R476:21,27,30-45) (see 
Addendum D). 
At all subsequent hearings prior to trial, defendant repeated ad nauseum his request 
for counsel (R477:3-4,6,8-10,16; R478:3-5; R479:3-8; 459:7,13,19-20). The trial court 
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explained repeatedly why he refused to appoint counsel, reiterated that defendant could hire 
whomever he pleased, and explained that until he did, he would be proceeding pro se with 
Mr. Gravis as second chair and having only limited involvement (R477:4-7,9; R479:4-7). 
Defendant complained that Mr. Gravis would not file defendant's motions, and Mr. Gravis 
clarified that he would only file motions he felt were appropriate (R477:6-7). 
Nearly seven weeks before trial, the judge and standby counsel explained the 
subpoena process, told defendant what he needed to do, and recommended that he start soon 
(R476:16-18). Defendant waited until two working days before trial to begin the process 
(R459:l 5-16). Nearly four weeks before trial, the judge explained to defendant the need for 
written voir dire and proposed jury instructions (R478:2-5). Defendant submitted pro se 
written objections to the State's jury instructions (R355), but expressly refused to submit the 
written instructions prepared by Mr. Gravis, submitted no voir dire questions, and claimed 
surprise at trial when he was told he would not be able to verbally ask questions of the jury 
panel (R479:2-3, 11; R459:10-ll, 15-16). 
At the pretrial conference immediately prior to seating a jury on September 30, 
defendant appeared without counsel, continued to invoke his right to counsel, and insisted 
he did notwanttorepresenthimself (R459:3-4,7,13,17-18,19-20) (in Addendum E). Once 
more, the judge explained the procedural history of the case, noting the specific conduct of 
defendant that repeatedly caused the absence of counsel (R459:5-8). When defendant 
complained of Mr. Gravis's alleged failure to represent him and blamed him for the absence 
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of defense witnesses, the trial judge again explained the role of standby counsel as well as 
the legal issues with which Mr. Gravis could be helpful (R459:4-5,13-20). After further 
discussion about prior defense counsel and their withdrawals, the judge insisted that trial 
proceed, and defendant sought removal of Mr. Gravis (R459:3-14). The trial judge's 
explanation of some of the disadvantages of self-representation was repeatedly interrupted 
by defendant's multiple complaints about the system, standby counsel, and his own 
inadequacies, after which the judge excused Mr. Gravis (R459:15-20).2 Defendant then 
explained,"... I'd like to have it on record that I didn't voluntarily [fire Mr. Gravis], but I'd 
like to have counsel here, but somebody that has my best interests . . . at stake instead of 
somebody that's not gonna argue anything or say anything in my behalf (R459:20). 
Defendant represented himself at trial and was convicted defendant as charged. The 
trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term often years to life in prison, to be 
served consecutively with the sentence he was already serving at the time (R449-50). 
Defendant timely appealed through appointed counsel (R453). 
2The court explained: 
. . . . He is trained in the law. He can help you on the law, the legal 
issues here, about the voir dire, about the jury selection, about the jury 
instructions, about cross-examination, there's a number of issues that he 
could help you with on this case. He doesn't represent you, but he certainly 
can give you advice. 
(R459:17-18). Defendant interrupted, and the court did not return to his explanation. 
However, this was only one of several points at which the court discussed the benefits of 
standby counsel and the dangers of self-representation. See Argument, subsectionB, infra. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Nicole Sather met defendant while he was in prison and dated him briefly when he 
was paroled (R459:137-38). Shortly after they broke up, defendant appeared on her doorstep 
in the early morning hours of January 3,2001, and threatened to kill her if she did not go for 
a ride with him and his younger cousin, Justin (R459:38,142-48,152-54). The three drove 
from Ogden to Payson, and defendant told Nicole on the way that she had messed with him 
one too many times and they would kill her in Payson (R459:155-64). During the trip, 
defendant and Justin had quite a bit to drink, and Justin kept by his side an S.K.S. rifle that 
later proved to be loaded (R459:159). 
When they arrived in Payson, Nicole found an opportunity to try to drive away (R 
459:170-73). But Justin shot at, and hit, the truck while defendant managed to get into the 
pickup and jump on Nicole to keep her from getting away (R459:170-71). Defendant 
became angry at the hole in his truck, and Nicole offered to pay for the damage (R459:173-
74). They called her credit union to verify that she had enough to cover it (R459:175-77). 
Defendant was appeased, and they returned to Salt Lake City to drop off Justin and the gun 
(R459:180-81). Defendant took Nicole home and stayed with her all night (R459:182-86). 
Nicole knew defendant and some of his friends, knew that he could be violent, and 
knew that he had been in prison (R459:137-41,186-87). She did not want to make him mad, 
so she decided to give him what he wanted and get away from him (R459:140-41,186). 
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However, the next morning, defendant drove them toward Park City, telling her that he was 
going to fulfill a dream he had and kill himself after killing her (R459:200-01). 
They stopped for gas near Park City (R459:201-03). Nicole went with defendant into 
the store and slipped away from him (id). She ran upstairs where one clerk hid her in a 
trucker's shower (R459:204-05; R460:81-84,86). The clerk went downstairs where 
defendant was frantically looking for a blonde woman, but the clerk denied having seen one 
(R460:86-88). Defendant eventually left (R460:90). 
The clerk retrieved Nicole, and they called 911 (R460:91-94). Nicole was eventually 
persuaded to tell the Ogden police what happened (R450:183-84; R459:211). During an 
investigation, the police talked to defendant and Justin, who claimed to have the same alibi 
(R450:185,196-97). After officers found the bullet and the bullet hole in the truck, Justin 
gave police the gun and said that they intended to kill Nicole that night (R460:190-91,203-
05,215-18). He described defendant's obsession with Nicole and his plan to end it by killing 
her, where they were going to put the body, what their alibi would be for the night, and what 
he had done with the gun once he knew the police were investigating (R461:75-79,82-85). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Subsection A: The trial judge properly determined that defendant had waived his 
right to counsel by his persistent dilatory conduct, which contradicted his repeated verbal 
invocation of the right. The court of appeals found that the waiver was voluntary and 
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unambiguous, noted the absence of any Frampton colloquy, then held that the waiver was 
not knowing and intelligent. 
Where manipulative and disruptive conduct by defendant obstructs the orderly and 
efficient progress of the case and gives rise to an implied waiver of the right to counsel, a 
thorough de novo review of that conduct is required to determine the validity of the implied 
waiver. Consideration should be given not only to what the conduct reveals about 
defendant's knowledge and understanding regarding the consequences of his continued 
conduct and the difficulties inherent in self-representation, but also to the effect of 
defendant's manipulation on the court's ability to move the matter forward. Implied waiver 
by conduct requires that the trial court conduct a balancing of these factors, making a 
thorough de novo review of the record on appeal more imperative. 
Alternatively, extraordinary circumstances exist in this case because the dilatory 
conduct occurred over a prolonged period of time, defendant's own unreasonable demands 
prevented him from retaining counsel, he refused to proceed pro se even though his conduct 
made it unavoidable, and his conduct thwarted the trial judge's multiple attempts to move the 
matter forward by use of every other reasonable alternative, leaving the judge to proceed as 
he did if this matter was ever to advance to trial. Absent de novo review under these 
circumstances, the system is open to manipulation by intelligent defendants and can be 
dangerously undermined unless de novo review is permitted. 
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Subsection B: De novo review of the record reveals that defendant's waiver of his 
right to counsel was both knowing and intelligent. Even absent a Frampton colloquy, the 
record shows that defendant understood the ramifications of appearing at trial without 
counsel and the sorts of dangers inherent in representing himself against a serious charge. 
Defendant also understood both the nature of the first degree felony charge of aggravated 
kidnapping and the range of possible punishments which he could suffer from a conviction. 
In any event, where the waiver of the right to counsel arises from conduct intended 
by defendant to delay or prevent trial, that conduct may be seen as the functional equivalent 
of a knowing and intelligent waiver. By his conduct, defendant delayed the efficient running 
of the judicial process nearly twenty-one months. He repeatedly and unreasonably rejected 
competent appointed and retained counsel while insisting on his right to representation by 
counsel, he adopted and refused to abandon a position that would require his counsel to act 
unethically and thereby prevented accommodation of his right to counsel, he refused to 
cooperate with three appointed counsel and vacillated between accepting and rejecting help 
from PDA, he unreasonably insisted that his counsel file and argue his pre-trial motions even 
after they were rejected by the trial court, he delayed the proceedings at every turn and 
manipulated the facts to shift blame for the delays away from himself, he ultimately rejected 
even standby counsel, and he ignored numerous attempts by the trial judge to move the case 
forward. This conduct, together with defendant's ultimate appearance at trial without 
retained counsel despite his ability to hire one and numerous warnings that failure to have 
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counsel would result in self-representation, establish the functional equivalent of a knowing 
and intelligent waiver. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S PERSISTENT DILATORY CONDUCT OVER A 
PROLONGED PERIOD, DESPITE THE TRIAL COURT'S 
WARNINGS AND EFFORTS TO ACCOMMODATE HIS REQUEST 
FOR COUNSEL, IMPLIEDLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, 
AND DE NOVO REVIEW OF THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT 
THE WAIVER WAS KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT 
INTRODUCTION 
A defendant may waive his right to counsel so long as he does so knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily. See, generally, State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 
1987). The court of appeals panel properly determined that defendant had been given 
constitutionally permissible choices by which to achieve his right to counsel, and that "his 
choice, however reluctant or conditional, was voluntary and unambiguous." State v. 
Pedockie, 2004 UT App 224, \ 34,95 P.3d 1182 (quoting State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, \21, 
979 P.2d 799, reh'g denied (Jun 16, 1999)) (emphasis in Pedockie). 
The preferred method of establishing whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent is 
by use of an on-the-record colloquy between the trial court and the defendant in which the 
defendant is fully informed "of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that 
the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes 
open." Bakalov, 1999 UT45 at^ [23 (quotingFrampton, 737 P.2d at 187 (additional citation 
omitted)). Where such a colloquy is absent, this Court has determined there must be 
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extraordinary circumstances before an appellate court "will look at any evidence in the record 
to determine whether the particular facts and circumstances support a valid waiver." State 
v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 918 (Utah 1998). 
However, more recently, this Court "was careful to note" that "the validity of a waiver 
would turn not on whether the trial judge actually conducted the colloquy, but rather 'upon 
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case.'" State v. Hassan, 2004 UT 99, 
If 22, 514 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (quoting Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188), reh'g denied (Dec. 14, 
2004). More specifically, this Court reiterated that it would "'look at any evidence in the 
record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se."' Id. 
(quoting Frampton, 131 P.2d at 188). While Hassan involved a case where detailed review 
of the record was not called for because the trial court conducted two Frampton colloquys, 
this Court's recognition of the need for and importance of record evidence absent a colloquy 
without reference to the "exceptional circumstances" language of Heaton reaffirms the 
importance of de novo review and properly places the focus on defendant's knowledge and 
understanding instead of on the information imparted by the court. 
Because the trial court in this case conducted no Frampton colloquy, the court of 
appeals turned to the existence of extraordinary circumstances before deciding the waiver's 
validity. Pedockie, 2004 UT App 224 at ^  35. The panel sidestepped the question, however, 
noting that even if such circumstances existed, a de novo review of the record revealed that 
the waiver was neither knowing nor intelligent. Id. at fflf 35-39. Specifically, the court held 
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that the record lacked any indication that defendant understood the nature of the charge 
against him, the range of possible punishments, or the consequences of self-representation. 
Id. at ffif 36-38. 
The court of appeals' opinion does not reflect a thorough de novo review of the record 
because the panel failed to expressly evaluate the relationship between defendant's conduct 
and his knowledge of the charge, the possible punishments, and the risks of self-
representation. The waiver of the right to counsel in this case was implied from defendant's 
dilatory and obstructionist behavior and occurred despite his repeated verbal invocation of 
the right. A thorough review of that behavior in light of the surrounding circumstances is, 
therefore, critical. See United States v. Hughes, 191 F.3d 1317,1323-24 (10th Cir. 1999), cert 
denied, 529 U.S. 1022 (2000). A proper and thorough review must take into account the 
totality of the conduct which gave rise to the implied waiver and the effect of that conduct 
on the trial court's finding that the waiver was both knowing and intelligent. An appropriate 
review of the record here reveals that the waiver was both knowing and intelligent, 
A. WHERE WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS BASED ON 
DEFENDANT'S DILATORY CONDUCT AND NO COLLOQUY WAS 
CONDUCTED, DE NOVO REVIEW OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL 
IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE WAIVER 
There is no doubt either that a defendant has a state and federal constitutional right 
to counsel in criminal proceedings, or that he may waive that right and exercise his right to 
conduct his own defense. See Hassan, 2004 UT 99 at f 21 (reviewing an affirmative waiver 
of the right to counsel); Frampton, 131 P.2d at 187 (same). Waiver frequently occurs 
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through an affirmative request either to waive the right to counsel or to invoke the right to 
proceed pro se. See Hassan, 2004 UT 99 at ffif 20, 24; Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at Tf 19. 
"[W]aiver in the right to counsel context" is generally used to refer to an "intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." LaFave, Israel & King, Criminal 
Procedure, §11.3(c) at 547-48 (2d ed. 1999) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. 
Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099 (5th Cir. 1995). Consequently, trial courts must ensure that 
waivers are knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See Hassan, 2004 UT 99, at f 21; State v. 
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, at ^ 15. 
It is also widely recognized that circumstances exist in which a defendant may 
impliedly waive or forfeit his right to counsel by his conduct in lieu of his words. See 
generally LaFave, Israel & King, supra, §11.3 at 548; see also Hughes, 191 F.3d at 1323-24 
("a defendant may waive his right to counsel by his conduct, particularly when the conduct 
consists of tactics designed to delay the proceedings"). At the extreme are cases involving 
physically combative defendants whose egregious behavior permits a "forfeiture" of the right 
to counsel, regardless of the existence of a colloquy. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F. 3d 
237, 249 (3rd Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by physically 
assaulting his attorney), cert denied, 528 U.S. 868 (1999); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 
322, 325-26 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that "a defendant who is abusive toward his attorney 
may forfeit his right to counsel"); State v. Montgomery, 530 S.E.2d 66, 69 (N.C. 2000) 
(defendant forfeited his right to counsel without a colloquy where he purposefully sought to 
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delay the proceedings by refusing to cooperate with his counsel and assaulting him). 
"Forfeiture" entails "the loss of a right regardless of the defendant's knowledge thereof and 
irrespective of whether the defendant intended to relinquish the right." United States v. 
Goldberg, 61 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3rd Cir. 1995); see generally LaFave, Israel & King, supra, 
§ 11.3(c) at 547-48. 
A defendant's conduct which falls short of physical assault but is no less disruptive 
and repugnant may give rise to an implied "waiver by conduct." See Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 
1099-1100 ("Once a defendant has been warned that he will lose his attorney if he engages 
in dilatory tactics, any misconduct thereafter may be treated as an implied request to proceed 
pro se and, thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel."); see generally LaFave, Israel & King, 
supra, § 11.3(c) at 547-48. Many courts do not distinguish between "waiver by conduct" and 
"forfeiture," but they agree that circumstances exist in which a defendant's actions may speak 
louder than his words, and his conduct may justify implication of a waiver despite the 
absence of any affirmative verbal request. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (a 
defendant may lose his Sixth Amendment right to be present at trial whether or not he wishes 
it where he is aware of the consequences of his continued conduct and fails to change that 
conduct); see Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1099, 1100 (noting the confusion between the terms in 
many courts). 
One area in which courts agree that a waiver by conduct may arise is when dealing 
with a defendant's manipulative and disruptive behavior. See Hughes, 191 F.3d at 1323-24 
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("[Wjhere a defendant egregiously manipulates the constitutional right to counsel so as to 
delay, disrupt, or prevent the orderly administration of justice[,]" he "may waive his right to 
counsel by his conduct"); United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 1390 (10th Cir. 1991) 
("[Tjhere must be some limit to the defendant's ability to manipulate the judicial system") 
(quoting United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d at 111), cert denied, 502 U.S. 1106 (1992); Tyler 
v. State, 581 S.W.2d 328, 330-31 (Ark. 1979) (where the right to retain counsel is 
manipulated to obstruct the orderly procedures of the court, a waiver of the right to counsel 
exists); King v. Superior Court, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 585, 596 (Cal. App 3rd Dist 2003) ("Courts 
cannot tolerate misconduct by a defendant that seeks to delay or disrupt judicial 
proceedings."); State v. Tarumoto, 614 P.2d 397, 399-400 (Ha. 1980) (failure to attempt to 
obtain counsel evidenced a deliberate and intentional rejection of counsel and unequivocally 
waived the right to counsel); Cummings v. Newton, 546 N.W.2d 406, 420 (Wis. 1996) 
(continual refusal to cooperate with court-appointed counsel while at the same time refusing 
to waive the right to counsel "cannot be condoned when [it is] used solely to 'interfere with 
the proper administration of criminal justice.'") (quoting A lien, 397 U.S. at 343); see also 
LaFavre, Israel & King, supra, § 1 ] .3(e) at 548 ("What these courts have held, in effect, is 
that the state's interest in maintaining an orderly trial schedule and the defendant's 
negligence, indifference, or possibly purposeful delaying tactic, combined to justify a 
forfeiture of defendant's right to counsel in much the same way that defendant's disruptive 
behavior or voluntary absence can result in the forfeiture of his right to be present at trial"). 
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All such manipulative conduct, however subtle or covert, possesses the potential to delay or 
disrupt judicial proceedings. 
The triggering event for judicial review of a defendant's conduct is when, as here, the 
court suspects that the "'orderly and efficient progression of the case [is] being frustrated"' 
by defendant. Cummings, 546 N.W.2d 406,418 n.15 (Wis. 1996) (quoting State v. Woods, 
424 N.W.2d 730 (Wis. App 1988)). When the review reveals that the conduct is designed 
to manipulate the judicial system, an implied waiver is appropriate. See Brickert v. State, 673 
N.E.2d 493,496 (Ind. App 1997) (where defendant's conduct can amount only to a deliberate 
attempt to frustrate the judicial process and avoid being brought to trial, his conduct amounts 
to an unequivocal waiver of his right to counsel), reh yg denied (Feb. 20, 1997); Colbert v. 
State, 714 P.2d 209, 211 (Ok. Cr. App. 1986) (a one year delay in getting the case to trial 
because of defendant's failure to retain counsel was "inexcusable and done solely for dilatory 
purposes" and amounted to a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel); 
Cummings, 546 N.W.2d at 418-19 (defendant's obvious dissatisfaction with his three 
appointed counsel, his refusal to accept their advice, and his unwillingness to waive his right 
to counsel demonstrated his agenda of delay designed to prevent trial). 
Even courts favoring an express colloquy when reviewing an express waiver of the 
right to counsel will embark on a de novo review of manipulative conduct in the absence of 
a colloquy to determine whether it gives rise to an implied waiver of the right to counsel. 
See, e.g., Willie, 941 F.2d at 1390-91 (defendant's conduct constitutes an implied waiver of 
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his right to counsel, even absent a formal inquiry, where the circumstances establish that he 
was playing "a cat and mouse game with the court"); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 
163, 166-67 (10th Cir. 1980) (even absent a formal colloquy, the record showed both 
defendant's impermissible "game" with the court and his understanding of the dangers of 
self-representation, so that his "stubborn failure to hire an attorney constituted a knowing and 
intelligent waiver" of the right to counsel); see also United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319, 
1321-22 and n. 1 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that in waiver by conduct cases, "a majority of the 
circuits have adopted a nonformalistic approach to determining sufficiency of the waiver 
from the record as a whole rather than requiring a deliberate and searching inquiry."). This 
is, in part, due to the fact that, left unchecked, a defendant bent on delay will be able to hold 
the system hostage, thereby delaying or preventing the "efficient and effective administration 
of criminal justice," until the likelihood of a fair trial, or any trial at all, is extremely remote. 
See Cummings, 546 N.W.2d at 419-20 (permitting review of defendant's manipulative 
conduct absent a colloquy and recognizing that a court's inability to determine that defendant 
has forfeited his right to counsel by his conduct would theoretically permit an intelligent 
defendant to "go through tens of court-appointed attorneys and delay his trial for years"). 
A trial court must balance the real potential for significant harm to the proceedings 
which arises from a defendant's manipulative conduct against defendant's preservation of 
his constitutional rights and must provide sufficient opportunity for the exercise of those 
rights without permitting defendant's disruptive and dilatory conduct to undermine the 
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system or the prosecution before the court. See United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952,956 
(10th Cir. 1987); see also Siniard v. State, 491 So.2d 1062, 1064 (Al. Cr. App 1986) 
(defendant may not indefinitely postpone trial by his dilatory conduct but may be required 
to proceed to trial without counsel); People v. Williams, 440 N.E.2d 843, 846 (111. 1982) (a 
defendant may not use his right to counsel "as a weapon to indefinitely thwart the 
administration of justice or to otherwise embarrass the effective prosecution of crime") 
(quoting People v. Friedman, 403 N.E.2d 229 (111. 1980)) (additional quotation omitted). 
That balancing is most appropriately demonstrated in the record evidence, especially 
where the defendant is bent on delay and the trial court believes that the colloquy would be 
superfluous, as occurred here (R473:12-14). See, e.g., State v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538,540 (5th 
Cir. 1983) ("a persistent, unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel and appointment of 
new counsel... is the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel"); 
Brickert, 673 N.E.2d at 496 (where defendant's conduct "can only be interpreted as a 
deliberate attempt to frustrate the judicial process," advisements of the dangers of self-
representation and warnings of the consequences of defendant's continued conduct would 
have been superfluous); Cummings, 546 N. W.2d at 418-19 (when faced with a manipulative 
or disruptive defendant, a court may find that the manipulative conduct gives rise to an 
implied waiver of the right to counsel by operation of law). To facilitate that balancing, some 
courts look to whether defendant was adequately informed of how his conduct was offensive 
and of the effect the continued conduct would have on his invocation of his right to counsel. 
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Once warned, continuation of the conduct evidences a valid waiver. See Allen, 397 U.S. at 
343 (permitting an implied waiver by conduct of defendant's right to be present at trial "after 
he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive 
behavior" where he thereafter continued the same conduct); Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 
753 (5th Cir. 1984) (waiver was implied from defendant's conduct where he was repeatedly 
informed that new counsel would not be appointed for him, he knew the result of his 
continued conduct would be self-representation, and he continued the same conduct); United 
States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir.) (defendant's refusal to retain counsel, despite 
his ability to do so and his verbal invocation of his right to counsel, amounted to a waiver of 
the right to counsel where the judge told him enough about self-representation "to steer any 
reasonable person away from [it]"), cert denied, 506 U.S. 882 (1992). 
Consequently, not only may a defendant waive his right to counsel by his manipulative 
and disruptive conduct, but the appellate court's evaluation of that implied waiver should 
include not only a review of the verbal exchanges between defendant and the trial court, but 
a review of defendant's conduct under the specific circumstances. Otherwise, the system is 
open to manipulation by canny defendants in a manner that is not at issue when a defendant 
verbally and unambiguously waives his right to counsel or affirmatively invokes his right to 
self-representation. 
The trial judge in this case expressly recognized defendant's manipulation and abuse 
of the system and clearly felt that the "orderly and efficient progression of the case [was] 
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being frustrated" (R331; R473:l 1,18,20-21; R.479:5-8; R.459:7,9,l 1). See Cumrnings, 546 
N.W.2d at 418 n. 15. Consequently, a careful de novo review of the record is necessary to 
determine the validity of the implied waiver by conduct. Assuming that a Frampton colloquy 
is relevant in waiver-by-conduct cases, defendant's offending conduct, blatantly 
contradictory to his repetitious invocation of his right to counsel, is inseparable from the trial 
court's determination that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and 
requires review in the absence of a colloquy (R459:7). 
Given the facts at hand, the absence of authority in this jurisdiction to guide the trial 
court's actions, and the potential for systemic damage from the precedent set by the court of 
appeals' decision, a detailed de novo review of the record is warranted to properly evaluate 
whether defendant had the intelligence and capacity to understand the ramifications of his 
persistent invocation of the right to counsel and his contradictory sabotage of that right 
through his conduct. Failure to do so may well encourage future dilatory conduct in attempts 
to prolong the proceedings enough to prevent a fair trial on the merits of any charges. 
B. A DE NOVO REVIEW OF THE RECORD REVEALS THAT THE IMPLIED 
WAIVER BY CONDUCT WAS KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT 
The trial court's determination in this case that defendant's conduct gave rise to a 
knowing and intelligent waiver is readily apparent from a proper de novo review of the 
record, despite the absence of a colloquy. The waiver in this case arose from defendant's 
dilatory and obstructionist conduct, which contradicted his repeated verbal invocation of his 
right to counsel. The court of appeals found that the record lacked evidence that defendant 
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"in fact understood the consequences of representing himself," and that he understood "the 
nature of the charge against him and the range of possible punishments." Pedockie, 2004 UT 
App 224, fflf 37-38. However, a thorough review of the record reveals defendant's 
understanding of both points. 
Alternatively, the totality of defendant's dilatory conduct under the circumstances of 
this case amounts to the functional equivalent of a knowing and intelligent waiver. 
1. The record demonstrates a knowing and intelligent waiver by conduct 
Generally, a waiver of the right to counsel must be both knowing and intelligent, a 
determination of which "turns upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each 
case." See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at *| 22 (additional quotation omitted). Under the facts of 
this case, defendant's implied waiver was both knowing and intelligent. 
Difficulties inherent in self-representation-The record reveals defendant's 
understanding of the difficulties inherent in self-representation. His adamant and repetitive 
rejection of the option because of his lack of legal qualifications, and his insistence that an 
attorney present defendant's own "crucial" motions even after defendant argued and lost 
them pro se, speaks volumes about defendant's understanding of the importance of legal 
training and the significance of his lay status (R103, 317; R467:31,139; R468:3,5,8,ll; 
R471.-11; R473:6-7,12,25,28; R474:4,8-9,ll; R476:2-3,8-l 1,15,24-25; R477:3-4,6-7,8-9; 
R478:4-5; R479:4). He clearly grasped that lawyers were schooled to conduct themselves 
in court, that their ability to properly present a given issue increased the odds of success, and 
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that he could not perform at the same level in a courtroom as an attorney (id). He also 
understood that, as a non-lawyer, he was much less likely to persuade the court, let alone a 
jury, of his position on any of the issues (id). 
His conduct also revealed that he recognized the existence of rules and procedural 
requirements as well as the fact that he was required to act within those requirements 
whenever he represented himself (R248,251; R473:12; R459:3-4). For example, defendant 
repeatedly demonstrated that he knew he must register objections and make a clear record, 
that both would be required for an appeal, and that his lay status did not excuse him from 
complying with those requirements (R.104,305,357;R465:146;R468:6-7,9,23-24;R471:3,5-
6;R473:11-12;R474:2;R476:4,10-11,13-14,19,49^ 
R459:7-8). This was most obvious at the August 13,2002, motion hearing where defendant 
spent most of the first fourteen pages of the transcript attempting to get a continuance to find 
counsel to do his motions (R476:1 -14). When pushed to deal with the first motion, he noted, 
"if I don't object then this is going to affect my appeal or whatever happens from the 
outcome of my trial. This is a very important thing. I'd like an attorney to argue these so that 
it's properly done." (R476:10). Standby counsel noted that defendant was concerned "about 
preserving a record for appeal," and defendant demonstrated as much by repeatedly noting 
that he wanted to be sure his objections and concerns were "on the record" (R476:10-11,13). 
He recognized the need to support his claims with evidence when he cited to specific pages 
of the preliminary hearing transcript during his argument, and, thereafter attached affidavits 
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to his motion to dismiss for alleged prosecutorial misconduct and sought transcripts for use 
in his defense (R241-47,353-54,357; R467:31,34; R474:3-4,10-l 1,13-14; R476:6,9-10,22-
23,34; R478:6-7; R479:3,6-7,9-10; R459:4-5). 
Nothing in defendant's conduct suggested that he harbored any misgiving that pro se 
representation would permit him to simply tell his story to the jury. Defendant knew that he 
needed to be "familiar with the rules of evidence and procedures," that he was able to make 
peremptory challenges, and that there was a proper way to cross-examine witnesses 
(R248,251; R459:3-5,18). He knew he would be able to call witnesses but that he would 
have to subpoena them himself (R305;R476:16-18,24-29,47-48;R459:3-5). Herecognized 
that the procedural rules went beyond trial to impose time limits on filing an appeal and knew 
those limits would apply to him (R476:10-l 1). 
Defendant knew of the existence of the Utah Code, the state and federal constitutions, 
and the rules of criminal procedure, and his proper use of these authorities in his written 
documents and his many discussions with the court demonstrate his knowledge of their 
usefulness and their application to his presentation of the legal issues in this case (R248-
54,318-20,355,357; R467:30-31; R459:3-4). He also properly commented on the 
impeachment evidence sought by the State, noting that it would be admissible only if it 
related to his honesty or dishonesty, that he did not plan on taking the stand at trial, and that 
he had a right to keep his past out by refusing to testify (R477:14-15; R478:6). He filed at 
least 12 different pro se motions and other documents in the course of this case, and had 
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already prepared the first motion and a discovery request before the preliminary hearing 
(R26-27,145-46,149-50; R465:145-49).3 He prepared coherent objections to the State's 
notice of intent to rely on hearsay (R356), and to the State's jury instructions (R355). He was 
familiar with the code's statutory speedy trial provision and the statute under which he was 
charged (R24,83,167,184,220,248-53,355,467;R466:5-6,138;R467:138-40). He knew he 
was entitled to discovery and that he had to request it (R353-54; R459:4-5). He knew the 
difference between "just a dismissal" and "a mistrial" and knew that a dismissal could be 
"with prejudice" (R248-52; R476:24-25). 
Defendant also knew that standby counsel was important in preparing for and 
presenting trial and that he could be of help in dealing with the unknown rules and 
restrictions that would confront defendant at trial The trial judge repeatedly informed 
defendant that standby counsel could help him with much of the legal information, including 
jury instructions, voir dire, subpoenas, evidentiary stipulations and issues generally, appeals, 
and acquiring transcripts (R357; R474:ll-12; R475:l 1-12,16-19, 29-30; R476:27,47-50). 
3His pro se filings included: a motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct 
(R241-47); a motion to dismiss for denial of fast and speedy trial (R248-51); a motion for 
change of venue (R252-54); a motion to appeal the court's decision on his dismissal 
motions (R317); a motion to dismiss for ineffective assistance of counsel (R318-20); a 
notice of filing of petition for interlocutory appeal (R350-51); a request for voucher for 
investigatory purposes (R352); a motion for production of evidence (R3 53-54); a 
challenge to the state's proposed jury instructions (R355); an objection to the state's 
notice of intent to rely on hearsay (R356); a motion to quash and to dismiss evidence of 
his use of a gun (R386); and a motion to quash and suppress Nicole Sather's testimony 
(R387-88). 
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The judge expressly informed defendant that standby counsel was "trained in the law/' and 
was available to give him advice on the law, including legal issues and procedural issues like 
jury selection, cross-examination, drafting motions, and "a number of [other] issues" 
(R459:4-5,14,16-17; R473:20,27-28; R477:4). Defendant actively used his standby counsel 
during the August 13, 2002 motion hearing, asking him questions and expressing a need to 
talk with him on certain matters outside the courtroom (R476: passim; R459:16-17). Clearly, 
defendant knew that standby counsel had relevant information to impart regarding courtroom 
presentations and legal details which were necessary to his pro se in-court performance, and 
he knew that he himself did not possess that information. 
The trial judge took a last opportunity before trial to explain to defendant some of the 
details he could expect to face at trial. The court explained how to handle exhibits during 
the trial, informed him that he could not wander around the courtroom but must remain at the 
table, and explained that he must submit his voir dire questions in writing (R459:9-10). 
Defendant repeatedly complained that he had "no clue" about what he was doing, 
demonstrating that he understood the judge's expectation that he would have to comply with 
the specific rules and boundaries inherent in conducting a trial (R459:3-4,l 1,13,17-18). 
However, he also demonstrated that he expected to be no more restrained in his self-
representation than the prosecutor, clarifying that his access to the jury panel would be 
identical (R459:10-11). 
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The fact that defendant insisted on the last-minute dismissal of his standby counsel 
when it became clear that the trial was going to go forward does not demonstrate that 
defendant did not understand the difficulties inherent in what he was about to do. It simply 
shows his continued orchestration of the proceedings. He chose to put himself in a position 
that would permit him to present the most favorable appellate argument possible because, 
just as with his pre-trial motions, he knew he stood a minimal chance of success at trial 
absent an attorney, and he knew he was no longer able to avoid trial. 
Overall, the record demonstrates that defendant knew a good deal about what was 
involved in a criminal case and what was expected of him whenever he was required to speak 
for himself or argue his own case. He also repeatedly recognized his own limitations, noting 
to the court his inability to represent himself against an educated attorney and the fact that 
he knew "nothing about the law" (R317; R467:31,139; R468:l 1; R.473:6-7,25; R474:4,8; 
R476:2-3,8-ll,15,24-25;R477:3-4,6,8-9;R478:4-5;R479:4). Itisapparentfromathorough 
de novo review of defendant's conduct that he understood the difficulties inherent in self-
representation, even absent a recorded colloquy. 
Nature of charge and possible punishment—Defendant also knew of the nature of 
the charge and the potential punishment. Defendant admitted that, at the initial appearance, 
the trial court reviewed the charge and the penalties with him (R6-7,252; R463:2). At 
various points thereafter and throughout the lengthy pre-trial period, reference was made by 
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the court and various counsel to the importance of the charges and the complicated nature 
of the case (R252,352; R466:6-7,10-13). 
Defendant repeatedly noted that the case was extremely important, the charge was 
"serious[,]" and the severity of the charge required not only the assistance of counsel, but 
nearly $4,000 in investigative funds for "scientific testing, witness gathering, testimony 
taking, expert witnesses, paper, pencils, postage, etc." (R352; R464:13; R468:5-8). He cited 
to the aggravated kidnapping statute in his pro se written objection to the State's proposed 
jury instructions and challenged the elements outlined in the instructions, evincing an 
understanding of the charge and its elements (R352,355). 
When the judge bound the case over, he stressed that it was an aggravated kidnapping 
and a first degree felony (R465:142). At various points throughout the proceedings, the 
judge noted that the case involved aggravated kidnapping and was a first degree felony, and 
that the charge was not only seriousness but that an attorney would require more than ten 
days to prepare to defend it (R327; R473:8; R476:41-43). He told defendant, "The question 
is whether or not you committed a first degree felony of aggravated kidnapping. That's what 
we're here to try and that's what we'll let a jury decide is whether or not that occurred." (R. 
473:8). Defendant's own counsel stressed that it was "a first degree felony" (R463:15), and 
that "this is an extremely serious case for Mr. Pedockie . . . a first degree felony trial" 
(R471:7-8, 12-13). Multiple defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial judge noted that 
the case was sufficiently complicated to take from two to four days to try (R463:22; 
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R465:143; R466;19; R470:31; R473:23, 26-27). At one point, the trial judge explained to 
defendant that he was facing a "fairly serious charge[]", equated the charge to a murder 
charge, and noted that when trial dates conflicted between this case and a murder case, 
defendant's case was continued solely because it was not as old, not because it was less 
serious (R467:128-34; R468:13-14; R476:42-43). 
The record also demonstrates defendant's understanding of the possible punishments 
he was facing. In addition to reviewing the penalties with the court at his first appearance 
(R252), defendant was present at the March 27,2002, hearing at which the prosecutor twice 
explained that an amended information was being filed to reflect "that this is a six, ten, or a 
15 to life" offense and to ensure that defendant was aware of that (R463:16-18). Mr. Brass 
noted that it was "the same charge, just with some additional language" and the court noted 
that this was sufficient to "put him [defendant] on notice of the potential penalties involved" 
(id.). In addition, defendant's written objection to the State's jury instructions demonstrates 
his familiarity with the content of the charging statute, which expressly details the applicable 
range of punishment (R355). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(3) (1999). Add. C. Several 
times during the proceedings, defendant noted the seriousness of the charge and commented 
that his life was on the line here (R352; R464:13; R468:56-8; R473:5,8). At one point, 
defendant knowledge of Utah's sentencing scheme and his grasp of the potential criminal 
punishments showed when he commented that if he had threatened various witnesses as he 
claims the prosecutor did, he would "be charged with one to 15 witness tampering" (R476: 
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16). That sentencing familiarity is understandable in light of his prison experience, which 
was discussed at several points in the trial court (R25,94; R168-83; R194-217; R315-16; 
R366-67; R466:7-8; R470:14-23, 28-29;R464:12-13; R477:l 1-14; R478:5-7). 
Accordingly, the record supports a determination that defendant understood the nature 
of the charge, the potential penalties, and the disadvantages of self-representation, rendering 
his waiver of counsel knowing and intelligent. 
2. Defendant's dilatory conduct and his ability to retain counsel establish 
the functional equivalent of a knowing and intentional waiver 
Alternatively, where the waiver of the right to counsel occurs through a defendant's 
dilatory conduct, and especially where that conduct is accompanied by a refusal to proceed 
pro se, the specifics of defendant's conduct itself may amount to the functional equivalent 
of a knowing and intelligent waiver, regardless of whether the trial court did more than warn 
defendant that his continued conduct would result in pro se representation. See Moore, 706 
F.2d at 540; Brickert, 673 N.E.2d at 496. Defendant's conduct in this case was sufficiently 
egregious to amount to a knowing and intentional waiver. 
Two factors in this case combine to permit a determination that the functional 
equivalent of a knowing and intentional waiver of counsel existed here, even absent an 
express colloquy: 1) defendant's ability to retain counsel; and 2) defendant's repeatedly 
obstructive and dilatory behavior. 
First, where a defendant is financially able to retain counsel but refuses to do so, he 
waives the right to counsel at trial, especially where defendant's conduct "can only be 
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interpreted as an [intentional] attempt to frustrate the judicial process and avoid being 
brought to trial." Brickert, 673 N.E.2d at 496; see also Bauer, 956 F.2d at 695 ("the 
combination of ability to pay for counsel plus refusal to do so does waive the right to counsel 
at trial") (emphasis in original). 
We think it clear that although a defendant able to retain counsel is entitled to 
a reasonable time to secure counsel, he may not indefinitely postpone trial by 
continued applications for more time to seek representation. Whether 
additional time should be granted is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Further, where a defendant able to retain counsel has been advised by 
the court that he must retain counsel by a certain reasonable time, and where 
there is no showing why he has not retained counsel within that time, the court 
may treat his failure to provide for his own defense as a waiver of his right to 
counsel and require such defendant to proceed to trial without an attorney. 
United States v.Arlen, 252 F.2d 491,494 (2nd Cir. \95%)\ see also United States v. Gates, 557 
F.2d 1086, 1087 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant's delaying tactics during the three months 
between his arrest and the date of trial, and his request for additional time to secure retained 
counsel on the day of trial amount to a waiver of defendant's right to counsel), cert denied, 
434 U.S. 1017 (1978); Siniard, 491 So.2d at 1063-64 (where a defendant is able to retain 
counsel and is given a reasonable time to do so, "he may not indefinitely postpone trial by 
continued applications for more time to seek representation") (quoting Arlen, 252 F.2d at 
494); Tarumoto, 614 P.2d at 399 (failure to obtain counsel after having ample opportunity 
to do so amounts to an unequivocal and deliberate rejection of counsel and waiver of the 
right to counsel); Williams, 440 N.E.2d at 847 (when a defendant who is financially able to 
retain counsel has been told to do so, has been given a reasonable amount of time to do so, 
37 
then fails to do so without any reasonable cause, "the court may treat such a failure as a 
waiver of the right to counsel and require him to proceed" pro se); Brickert, 673 N.E.2d at 
496 (a warning that defendant would be required to proceed pro se if he did not obtain 
counsel before trial is so obvious as to be unnecessary, and a defendant who "continuously 
represented" that he would obtain an attorney after he refused to cooperate with three court-
appointed attorneys who ultimately withdrew will, by his conduct, be deemed to have 
unequivocally waived his right to counsel, even absent a discussion of the dangers of self-
representation); Colbert v. State, 714 P.2d 209, 211 (Ok. Cr. App. 1986) ("A defendant's 
failure to hire an attorney may constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to 
counsel if it was done to delay the trial of his case."); State v. Schmick, 660 P.2d 693, 696 
(Or. App. 1983) ("A defendant's right to retain counsel of his choice must, after a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise that right, be balanced against the state's need to conclude the case 
in a timely manner").4 
In this case, defendant had sufficient resources, multiple warnings, and ample time 
to retain counsel for the fifth trial setting, and his failure to do so occurred without reasonable 
justification. Defendant possessed "significant resources to hire private counsel" despite his 
4While the same result has been found in cases involving appointed counsel, the 
issue is not relevant to the decision in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Fazzini, 871 
F.2d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 1989) ("a defendant who refused to cooperate with numerous 
appointed counsel, who was warned of the consequences of his failure to cooperate would 
have, and who insisted, despite his conduct, that he was not waiving his right to appointed 
counsel" was properly found to have "knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 
appointed counsel"). 
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vacillation between demanding appointed counsel and demanding time to retain counsel 
(R299-300; R469:8-9; R472:2; R473:17-22, 27-29; R474:9-10,13-14; R459:6). The trial 
court warned defendant multiple times after the fourth trial date was stricken that the next 
setting would be that last, no further continuances would be permitted for counsel, and if 
defendant appeared without retained counsel, he would be required to proceed to trial as 
scheduled without the benefit of counsel (R471:15-16; R473:4,7,20-21,32; R476:6,19-20; 
R477:7-9; R478:2). The court also warned defendant countless times that his continued 
insistence on counsel who would file motions they believed to be frivolous would leave him 
without counsel and would ultimately require that he defend himself at trial (R304; R468:5-
6,9,11-12; R473:5-6,12-16,18,29; R474:9-10; R476:2-5,9,l 1-12,29; R477:4-9; R479:5-8; 
R459:5-6). 
Despite the warnings, defendant appeared for trial without counsel, arguing once 
again that he was unable to represent himself, dragging the court through his version of the 
procedural history of the case, and repeatedly invoking his right to counsel (R459:1-20). He 
offered no new reason, justifiable or otherwise, to explain the absence of retained counsel, 
and he insisted upon removal of standby counsel (R459:13-20). 
The trial judge did all he could to ensure that defendant had ample time and ample 
warning of the need for counsel before requiring that he represent himself. The record is 
clear that the only reason retained counsel did not appear is because of defendant's continued 
insistence that counsel file and argue motions they felt were meritless. Where the absence 
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of counsel on the day of trial was solely the fault of defendant's repetitive dilatory conduct, 
and where defendant offered no new or reasonable basis for the absence of retained counsel, 
the trial judge could properly treat his pro se appearance as the functional equivalent of a 
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. See United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 
635, 642 (7th Cir. 1989) ('"So long as the district court has given the defendant sufficient 
opportunity to retain the assistance of appointed counsel, defendant's actions which have the 
effect of depriving himself of appointed counsel will establish a knowing and intentional 
choice."); Brickert, 673 N.E.2d at 496. 
In addition to the defendant's ability, opportunity and failure to retain counsel, the trial 
court had before it defendant's persistent and prolonged dilatory conduct over the twenty-one 
months leading up to trial. There can be no doubt that defendant's conduct hindered the 
efficient administration of justice. His concerted efforts to frustrate the trial judge's attempts 
to conduct a trial with defense counsel are evident throughout the record. 
Insistence on a non-existent right to puppet counsel and rejection of pro se 
representation-The right to counsel does not include the right to a particular counsel, to 
puppet counsel, or to counsel who atgrees with defendant's particular views of the law. See 
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983); Weninger, 624 F.2d at 166 (defendant is not 
entitled to counsel who shares defendant's political ideals). One able to retain counsel may 
obtain counsel is constitutionally entitled only to competent counsel. See Wheat v. United 
States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); Moore, 706 F.2d at 538. 
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Defendant claimed adnauseum that he did not waive his right to counsel and that he 
did not want to represent himself (R103,253,241,317-19,357; R468:2-3,5,8; R471:3,ll; 
R473:12-13,20,28; R474:ll; R476:13; R477:3-4,6,8-10,16; R478:3-5; R479:3-8; 459: 
7,13,19-20). Yet all his actions contradicted his words and brought about his pro se 
representation at trial. He insisted "adequate" counsel was counsel who would file and argue 
his pre-trial motions, despite the consensus of those with whom he spoke that the motions 
were frivolous and could not ethically be filed (R468:2-5,7-8; R473:2,5-6,9-11,14-15,17,23; 
R.477:5-6). The trial judge explained countless times at no fewer than seven hearings that 
defendant was not entitled to counsel who would act unethically, that counsel could not be 
forced to file frivolous motions, and that defendant's persistence in rejecting counsel because 
they would not file his motions would result in his self-representation at trial (R304; R468:5-
6,9,ll-12;R473:5-6,12-16,18,29;R474:9-10;R476:2-5,9,ll-12,29;R477:4-7^ 
R459:5-6). Defendant acknowledged the warnings, then repeatedly ignored them, choosing 
instead to insist on the right to "adequate" counsel (R467:31-32; R468:ll; R469:6,8; 
R473:15,17; R459:20). That insistence resulted in his self-representation at trial. 
Defendant's conduct made it impossible for him to obtain counsel. 
Vacillation between appointed and retained counsel-Defendant went through three 
PDA attorneys before raising his ability to retain counsel at the November 29,2001, hearing 
(R6-7,82,3 89; R467:12-13). When defendant fired his third PDA attorney, he refused further 
representation by PDA, announced that his father "has money and everything," and claimed 
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thathewouldretainEdBrass(R1175118-19,1215318?389;R469:2-358-9;R472:2).Mr.Brass 
later withdrew and indicated that defendant would retain new counsel (Rl 84-85,190; R471:2-
15). Mr. Caine then appeared and assured the court that defendant could afford to retain 
counsel and would do so (R222,330; R472:2). Thereafter, defendant asked to speak with 
PDA (R229; R473:17-19), rejected their representation (R300; R473:18-19,22; R459:6), had 
PDA appointed as standby counsel (R300; R473:19-20,21,27-29), retained then fired Paul 
Grant (R232-3 5,23 8-40), asked for PDA (R474:9-10,14), again rejected PDA (R459:13-20), 
claimed that the trial court refused his repeated requests to appoint "proper counsel" 
(R241,317,319,352,353,357;R479:3),claimedheneverrejectedPDA(R459:7), and claimed 
he could not afford an attorney (R477:6; R479:3,7).5 Further, despite his written letter and 
his repeated admissions that he fired Mr. Retallick, defendant later claimed that he did not 
fire even one attorney (Rl 17,121; R469:2; R479:5). 
Irrational pursuit of pre-trial motions—Defendant's dilatory tactics are tied 
inextricably to his multiple motions, which he deemed "critical," "crucial," and "very 
necessary" to his case (R468:8; R473:29,32; R476: 8). He had prepared a motion to dismiss 
and a discovery request as early as the preliminary hearing, and his motions multiplied 
thereafter (R26-27;82,241-47,252-54,317-20,350-56,386-88;R465:145-46,149-50;R467:14-
15,32,126; R468:18-19 R474:4,5,10-l 1,13-14; R476:4,9-10,14-17). Defendant's main 
5The pattern continued after trial, with defendant filing an affidavit of 
impecuniosity (R435), retaining counsel for sentencing (R441), then appearing with 
appointed counsel (R443,448). 
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complaints involved: an inability to receive a fair trial, which required a change of venue 
(R253-54; R467:14-15,18; R468:ll; R474:4-5,10-ll,14; R476:15,25; R477:6; R478:7); 
violation of his statutory speedy trial right (R248-51; R467:138-40; R468:12; R469:5-6; 
R470:31-32; R471:10-ll; R472:5; R473:4; R476:30-34,40-45); and dismissal due to 
prosecutorial misconduct (R241-47,253; R467:15; R468:17,23; R473:passim; R474:4-5,11; 
R476:6,9-10,14-16,22-26; R477:7; R479:3-4). He was told by the court and counsel 
repeatedly that the motions were frivolous, yet he insisted that his various counsel file his 
motions and that his own signature be on them (R465:149-50; R467:16-18,125-28; R468:2-
3,5; R471:ll; R473:passim; R474:3-4,12; R476:l-14,18-19; R477:4,6-7). 
In an effort to resolve the apparent barriers to trial, the trial judge ultimately required 
that defendant present his own motions, then denied them (R94-95,167,304-05,321-34; 
R476:passim). He explained, as had Mr. Retallick, that some were more properly addressed 
by other means (R304-05,324; R468:7-8,17-19; R473:9-10; R474:11,23; R476:20-21,25-
28,30,40). However, defendant refused to accept either the judge's rulings or his advice. 
Instead, he continued to resist proceeding to trial, seeking to submit the motions to another 
judge or to retain counsel to re-file them (R229; R473:4,7-8,11,14,24; R474:10; R476:10,19-
21;R479:4). 
Various demands designed to maximize delay-Defendant did not stop at merely 
insisting that counsel argue his motions. He timed his demands to permit for the maximum 
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amount of delay possible, at the same time almost always refusing to waive, even 
temporarily, his statutory speedy trial right (R.459:18). 
-Defendant appeared in court on August 1,2001—eight working days before 
the scheduled trial—and sought and received a continuance to permit his 
public defender to file and argue his "initial motions" (R466:6,18-21,24). 
Despite his express agreement on the record at the hearing, he later claimed the 
continuance was without his consent (R467:139-40). 
-He later appeared in court on January 9,2002, to remove PDA from his case 
for not filing his motions, only to change his mind when he found he would 
have to proceed pro se (R 103-04,318,389; R468:2-9; R474:13; R476:2; 
R477:5). Knowing the delay he suffered with prison mail, the next day he 
wrote a letter that reached the court nine days later-ten working days before 
the scheduled trial date—to remove PDA, assert his ability to retain counsel, 
and seek a continuance to permit retained counsel to familiarize himself with 
the case (R117-19,389; R469:2-3; R463:12-15; R473:30-31). By the time 
defendant's new attorney appeared and obtained a continuance, only three 
working days remained until trial (R463:passim). 
-Retained counsel, Mr. Brass, represented defendant for two months with no 
apparent problem. He appeared with defendant in court on April 10 with no 
indication of any difficulty between them (R165,167; R470:passim). 
However, two days later-the last working day before trial-Mr. Brass sought 
to withdraw based on an "ethical" conflict involving defendant's motions and 
which prevented him from remaining as standby counsel (Rl 84-85,190-
91,330-31; R471:2-15). The trial was rescheduled. 
The repeated pattern of hiring and firing counsel within days of a trial setting and of 
seeking repeated continuances to locate "adequate" counsel was more than mere coincidence. 
Right up until trial occurred on the fifth setting, defendant was seeking time to retain 
"adequate" counsel, despite the fact that such counsel had not been found and many of the 
motions had been filed, argued, and denied (R241-54,304-05,321-34; R476:passim; 
R459:7,13,19-20). 
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Refusal to accept the warned consequences of his conduct or to prepare for 
trial-While insisting on the right to puppet counsel, defendant continued to reject any 
possibility that his conduct would result in his need to represent himself at trial. 
-The trial judge repeatedly warned him that the absence of counsel at the fifth 
trial setting would result in self-representation (R471:15-16; R473:4,7,20-
21,32; R476:6,19-20; R.477:7-9; R478:2). Defendant claimed he understood 
the admonition, then appeared without counsel (R471:16; R473:4,10; 
R477:14-15; R478:6-7; R459:2-3). 
-The trial judge explicitly warned him seven weeks before trial that he should 
contact standby counsel soon to start the subpoena process (R305;R476:16-
18,27-28). Defendant waited until two working days before trial to do so, 
resulting in his having at trial only those defense witnesses the State had 
subpoenaed for its case (R459:15). He then blamed standby counsel for the 
situation (R459:4). 
-More than four weeks before trial, the trial judge warned defendant that he 
needed to prepare and submit his voir dire questions and jury instructions to 
the court in writing (R477:16; R478:2-5). Defendant submitted no voir dire 
questions and claimed surprise at trial that he would not be permitted to 
question the panel himself (R459:10-l 1,15-16). He expressly refused to 
submit the jury instructions standby counsel had prepared for him (R479:2-
3,11; R459:15-16). In the mean time, he filed a written pro se objection to the 
State's proposed instructions (R479:2). 
Refusal to accept responsibility for any but minimal delay-Defendant repeatedly 
demonstrated that he was willing to say whatever was necessary to delay the case and shift 
blame away from himself. 
-At the motion hearing on August 13,2002, defendant attempted to delay the 
hearing by pointing out that his witnesses were not there (R476:7). He first 
blamed their absence on the court, noting that the hearing had originally been 
scheduled a day earlier, so the witnesses were not there "due to the fact that 
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it's not the right day" (R476: 7).6 When the court noted that no one had 
appeared the previous day, defendant blamed their absence on the fact that 
"[t]hey're scared to come because of retaliations [threatened by the prosecutor 
and state's investigator]" (R475:4-5; R476:7,26).7 Still later in the same 
hearing, he changed his mind again and claimed they would appear the next 
day (R476:26-27). Moreover, despite the fact that the witnesses at issue were 
defendant's friends and family, defendant claimed, "I don't know all their 
names or addresses[,]" suggesting he had never secured their presence in the 
first place and blaming it on prison restrictions (R476:22-23,26).8 In this one 
hearing, defendant revealed his intent to manipulate the situation to delay the 
trial. 
-Defendant again demonstrated his intent to delay the proceedings once the 
motion deadlines were set on May 29. Paul Grant filed an appearance as 
defense counsel on June 13, then executed a motion to withdraw three days 
later, reciting that defendant had fired him (R232,23 8). The trial court granted 
the motion by order dated June 27 (R240). Defendant knew before the hearing 
that his counsel was withdrawing and did nothing for several weeks until he 
was scheduled to appear in court. He then falsely pleaded ignorance about 
counsel's withdrawal and attempted to blame the absence of substitute counsel 
on that ignorance. Predictably, he then sought more time from the court to do 
what he could have been doing over the previous few weeks: finding counsel 
(R474:4,8-9,13). 
-Defendant insisted whenever possible that he was responsible for only one 
counsel's withdrawal, blaming his lack of counsel instead on the system, the 
prosecutor and PDA for failing to provide him with the "adequate" counsel to 
which he was entitled (R.318-20; R467:14-15,127,138-39; R468:2-4; 
R469:4,9-10; R471:10; R474:12-13; R459:6,9). 
6The prison failed to transport defendant on August 12, so the trial judge 
rescheduled the hearing for August 13 (R303-05; R475:2). 
7Defendant earlier told the court that his witnesses were "more than willing to 
come" (R474:5). 
8Despite supposedly not knowing their addresses, defendant was able to get 
affidavits from two of them before trial (R244-47). Moreover, he earlier claimed that the 
witnesses were "more than willing" to come to court to testify (R474:5). 
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-Defendant blamed all the delay occurring after November 29, 2001, on the 
prosecutor's continuance of the December 10 trial setting because of a conflict 
with a murder trial, claiming the continuance violated his statutory speedy trial 
rights and warranted dismissal of the charge (R82-83,248-51,319; 468:12-16; 
469:10-11; 470:31-33; R471:5-6;R476:31-32,40-43; R459:12-13). 
Contradictory conduct evidencing intentional delay-In addition to insisting on an 
imaginary right to counsel he could not find while refusing to prepare for the possibility of 
self-representation in the face of the trial court's admonitions, defendant exhibited other 
contradictory conduct which supported the trial court's determination of a valid waiver of 
the right to counsel. 
-Defendant invoked his statutory speedy trial right and eventually filed a 
motion to dismiss for a perceived violation of that right. At the same time, he 
actively worked to delay the trial, explaining that once a timely trial did not 
occur, he "couldn't really care less if it [the trial] goes" because he was entitled 
to a dismissal of the charges (R469:5-6; R471:10-l 1). The trial court twice 
listened to defendant's arguments and twice rejected them (R94-95,167,321-
34; R467:128-40; R470:31-33; R472:5-6; R473:2-6; R476:30). Defendant 
refused to accept the trial court's ruling, seeking instead to put his failed 
motions before other judges or to resubmit them through retained counsel 
(R229; R473:4,7-8,l 1,14,24; R474:10; R476:10,19-21; R479:4). He knew 
twenty seven days remained in the statutory period by the court's calculation, 
yet chose to continue his dilatory tactics instead of pursing trial (R268,332). 
-Defendant waited until more than two months after the preliminary hearing 
before he began to complain that it was untimely, later including the allegation 
in his motions and claiming a right to a new preliminary hearing (R184; 
R466:9-10; R467:138; R471:3-4; R476:45-46). 
-Seven weeks before the fifth trial setting, defendant was informed of a 
stipulation Mr. Brass had signed before he withdrew permitting a proffer at 
trial of foundation for business records in lieu of bringing witnesses from out 
of state (R218-19,305,315-16; R476:46-48). The court gave defendant a week 
to review the stipulation with standby counsel (R475:48). Defendant later 
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summarily objected to the stipulation simply because it involved the State's 
witnesses (R477:2-3,18). 
-Defendant repeatedly asserted that he was not responsible for any withdrawal 
of counsel prior to Mr. Retallick, his third PDA counsel, in January 2002 
(EG 18; R467:14-15; R468:2-4; R469:9-10; R474:12-13). However, he 
ultimately admitted that neither of the first two PDA counsel would file his 
motions and that he wanted the PDA off his case before the May 2001 
preliminary hearing because of it (R53,253; R464:12; R467:16,127,149; 
R469:3-8; R473:6; R474:4-5; R477:5; R459:6,9). 
-After Mr. Caine appeared with defendant on April 1, 2002, to explain that 
defendant intended to retain counsel, defendant failed to find a single attorney 
who would appear in court on his behalf. At the same time, defendant 
repeatedly refused representation from PDA, even though PDA was ultimately 
appointed as standby counsel (R300; R473:17-22,27-29; R459:6). 
-Defendant sought removal of his standby counsel immediately prior to 
seating a jury, then stated thereafter that he did not fire him (R459:13-20). 
Defendant's ability to retain counsel, his ample opportunity to do so, and his 
responsibility for the absence of counsel at the final trial setting and for the withdrawal of 
all previously-retained counsel independently gives rise to the functional equivalent of a 
knowing and intentional waiver by conduct of the right to counsel. See Bauer, 956 F.2d at 
695; FazzinU 871 F.2d at 642. 
In any event, that course of conduct together with defendant's remaining pervasive 
conduct, aimed at obstructing all efforts by the trial judge to move this case to trial with 
defense counsel, fully supports the trial court's decision that defendant knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel. The trial court went to great lengths to provide 
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defendant with every opportunity to take advantage of the right to counsel, to have the 
concerns in his motions addressed, and to avoid self-representation. The judge carefully and 
repeatedly reviewed with defendant his right to counsel, explaining what it did and did not 
entail and warning him repeatedly that his failure to listen to counsel would result in his 
having to go to trial representing himself. Defendant's pertinacious conduct left that court 
with the conviction that defendant was intentionally holding the system captive, playing a 
game and trying to prevent the matter from going to trial at all (R331; R473:l 1,18,20-21; 
R479:5-8; R459:7,9,l 1,218). With the integrity of the criminal system and the instant 
prosecution at stake, the trial judge properly treated defendant's conduct as a knowing and 
intentional waiver of the right to counsel. See Kelm, 827 F.2d at 1321-1323 (defendant's 
dilatory conduct in refusing an appointed attorney, refusing to waive his right to counsel, 
repeatedly delaying in retaining counsel, and imposing unreasonable restrictions on counsel 




For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
court of appeals' decision, find extraordinary circumstances to permit a de novo review of 
the record, and find that, by his conduct, defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his 
right to counsel. . 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f 'day of April, 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
aY 
C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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appealed. 
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held that: 
(1) "good cause" excused delay of trial of 
defendant for aggravated kidnapping beyond 
120-day period of Speedy Trial Statute; 
(2) defendant's choice to represent himself was 
voluntary and ambiguous; and 
(3) record did not support finding that defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 
counsel. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
**1 Defendant Robert Pedockie appeals his 
conviction of aggravated kidnapping, a first degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 
76-5-302 (1999). In particular, Defendant argues 
that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
dismiss because the State had failed to bring him to 
trial within 120 days in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated section 77-29-1 (1999) (Speedy Trial 
Statute); and (2) he was denied his state and federal 
constitutional right to assistance of counsel when 
the trial court determined that Defendant had 
waived his right to counsel and required him to 
represent himself. [FN1] We reverse and remand 
for a new trial. 
FN1. Defendant also argues that the trial 
court deprived him of his right to trial by 
an impartial jury when it gave a lengthy 
statement to the jury explaining 
Defendant's lack of counsel at trial. 
Because we reverse and remand for a new 
trial on other grounds, we do not address 
this argument. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 On January 3, 2001, Defendant went to the 
Ogden, Utah residence of his ex-girlfriend, Nicole 
Sather (Nicole), with his cousin, Justin Pedockie 
(Justin), and forced Nicole to accompany them on a 
drive in Defendant's truck. Justin carried a loaded 
rifle, and Defendant threatened to kill Nicole if she 
did not comply. At a stop in Pay son, Utah, Nicole 
attempted to flee in Defendant's truck but she was 
shot at by Justin and ultimately stopped by 
Defendant. Later that day, Defendant dropped 
Justin off in Salt Lake City and then took Nicole to 
her home in Ogden where the two went inside and 
fell asleep. The next morning, as Defendant drove 
Nicole toward Park City, Utah, he threatened to kill 
her and then himself. At a stop for gas near Park 
City, Nicole slipped away from Defendant with help 
from one of the gas station clerks. 
**3 Defendant was charged with aggravated 
kidnapping. At Defendant's initial appearance on 
February 20, 2001, the Honorable Pamela G. 
Heffernan appointed an attorney from the Weber 
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County Public Defenders' Association (PDA) to 
represent *1185 him. Defendant's first PDA 
attorney was Michael Bouwhuis, who was released 
from representing Defendant because he was 
actively representing two of the State's main 
witnesses. Defendant was then represented by a 
second PDA attorney, Michael Boyle. A 
preliminary hearing was set for April 13, 2001. 
However, at a hearing on April 10, 2001, Judge 
Heffernan recused herself from the case, and it was 
reassigned to the Honorable Ernie W. Jones, who 
set a preliminary hearing for May 25, 2001. 
**4 Defendant requested a 120-day disposition of 
his case pursuant to the Speedy Trial Statute, and on 
April 10, 2001, the Division of Institutional 
Operations at the Utah State Prison received the 
written notice. The trial court attempted to 
schedule trial for July 12, 2001, but defense counsel 
was not available until early August. Accordingly, 
Judge Jones bound Defendant over for trial. 
**5 At a pretrial conference on August I, 2001, 
trial was reset for December 10, 2001 at 
Defendant's request. Thus, Defendant waived his 
right to a 120-day disposition as to this continuance. 
**6 At a pretrial motion hearing on November 29, 
2001, Defendant was represented by a third PDA 
attorney, James Retallick, because Boyle's contract 
with Weber County had been terminated. The 
prosecutor requested a continuance of the trial date 
on the grounds that she had a murder trial set for 
December 10 in a case that predated Defendant's 
case. Retallick was prepared to go to trial on 
December 10. However, the trial judge found good 
cause for granting the continuance and issued 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on 
December 3, 2001. The trial court attempted to 
reschedule trial for January 7, 2002, and January 
14, 2002, but defense counsel was unavailable. 
Trial was then reset for February 4, 2002. 
**7 At a pretrial conference on January 9, 2002, 
Retallick indicated that Defendant had requested 
that he be terminated from Defendant's case because 
Retallick refused to file motions that Defendant 
insisted be filed. In particular, Retallick stated that 
Defendant wanted him to file motions regarding, 
inter alia, prosecutorial misconduct, 120-day 
disposition, and change of venue. Retallick had 
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explained to Defendant that he did not have grounds 
to file these particular motions and that he found the 
motions to be "absolutely frivolous." Defendant 
stated that he wanted counsel who would follow his 
direction and file the motions he requested. 
**8 The trial judge explained to Defendant that 
while he had a right to counsel, he did not have a 
right to counsel of his choice from PDA. The trial 
judge further explained that if Defendant did not 
want to accept the advice of Retallick, then he could 
either hire his own attorney or represent himself. 
Defendant indicated that he wanted Retallick to 
continue to represent him. At the end of the 
hearing, the court confirmed that the trial would go 
forward on February 4. 
**9 On January 23, 2002, the trial court held a 
hearing addressing the issue of Defendant's counsel. 
Both the court and Retallick had received letters 
from Defendant requesting that Retallick be 
removed from the case. At the hearing, Defendant 
reiterated his desire to have PDA released from his 
case and indicated that he had hired a private 
attorney, Ed Brass, to represent him. The court 
allowed PDA to withdraw from representing 
Defendant. Defendant requested that the trial be 
continued so that Brass could prepare for trial. At a 
subsequent hearing on January 30, 2002, the court 
granted Defendant's request for a continuance and 
set the trial for April 15, 2002. 
**10 In a telephone conference three days before 
trial, Brass informed the court that he could no 
longer represent Defendant because of an "ethical 
issue." The court allowed Brass to withdraw from 
the case and explained to Defendant that once the 
trial was reset, the court would not allow any further 
continuances. Specifically, the court stated, "I want 
[you] to understand, I'm not [going to] continue this 
case again.... I don't care what your excuse or 
reason is, you either get an attorney who will 
represent you on the matter or you're just [going to] 
represent yourself next time it's scheduled." 
**11 At another pretrial conference on May 1, 
2002, Defendant indicated that he was in the 
process of hiring an attorney from Provo but that 
the attorney had not yet agreed to *1186 take his 
case. At Defendant's request, the court set another 
pretrial conference for May 29, 2002. At that 
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hearing, Defendant appeared pro se and indicated 
that he had been unable to retain private counsel 
because the attorneys he had contacted believed that 
it was unethical to file the motions that he wanted 
filed. 
**12 The court again informed Defendant that if 
he was unwilling to follow the advice of counsel, 
then he would have to represent himself. Defendant 
stated that he was not capable of representing 
himself and that he desired counsel. The court 
informed Defendant that if PDA was appointed 
again, it was final, and Defendant could not then 
retain private counsel. Defendant indicated that he 
did not want PDA to represent him because he 
intended to retain counsel. 
**13 The court appointed PDA as standby counsel 
and informed Defendant that he could still retain 
private counsel. The court cautioned Defendant 
that there would be no further continuances and 
scheduled the trial for September 30, 2002. 
**14 Defendant subsequently filed three motions: 
motion for a change of venue, motion to dismiss for 
prosecutorial misconduct, and motion to dismiss for 
violation of the Speedy Trial Act. A pretrial motion 
hearing was set for July 31, 2002. At the hearing, 
Defendant stated that he had hired Paul Grant as his 
attorney. On June 13, 2002, Paul Grant had entered 
an appearance of counsel for Defendant. However, 
Grant had moved to withdraw because after meeting 
with Defendant at the Utah State Prison, Defendant 
"told counsel that he does not want counsel to be his 
attorney of record." The court allowed Grant to 
withdraw. After the court determined that Grant 
was no longer Defendant's attorney, Defendant 
requested representation, and the court again 
appointed PDA to represent him. 
**15 The pretrial motion hearing was rescheduled 
for August 12, 2002, but because the prison failed 
to transport Defendant, the hearing was reset for the 
following day. Martin V. Gravis from PDA 
appeared on behalf of Defendant. The court 
informed Gravis that he was to act as standby 
counsel for Defendant. At the August 13, 2002 
hearing, Defendant expressed his belief that the 
court had appointed PDA to represent him and 
again stated that he was not capable of representing 
himself. The court explained to Defendant that he 
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would not be granted any more continuances and 
must argue his motions at that time. Defendant 
initially refused because he wanted an attorney to 
argue his motions and Gravis, as standby counsel, 
would not. The court explained to Defendant that 
Gravis was available to assist Defendant with legal 
issues but that Gravis was not going to argue his 
motions. Further, the court again informed 
Defendant that if Defendant wanted an attorney to 
represent him, he must follow that attorney's advice 
or represent himself. Defendant agreed to argue his 
motions as long as the record reflected Defendant's 
desire to have an attorney argue his motions and his 
objection to self-representation. The court denied 
all three motions. 
**16 At another pretrial hearing on August 21, 
2002, Defendant again objected to representing 
himself and requested that counsel be appointed. 
Gravis again was present as standby counsel. The 
court again informed Defendant that he was not 
going to appoint another public defender because 
the court had "appointed several public defenders, 
[and] they've always asked to be recused because 
[Defendant] want[s] them to do something that's 
illegal that's a violation of the Canons of Ethics." 
**17 At the final pretrial conference on September 
18, 2002, Defendant reiterated his desire to have 
counsel appointed. The court again stated that it 
was not going to appoint another attorney because 
Defendant refused to follow the advice of counsel. 
Defendant stated that he believed the court was 
denying him access to counsel. 
**18 At trial on September 30, 2002, Defendant 
again asked for counsel. The court found that 
Defendant "knowingly and intelligently waived 
[his] right to an attorney in this matter." Prior to 
seating the jury, Defendant complained that Gravis 
had refused to subpoena witnesses. The court again 
explained that Gravis did not represent Defendant 
but was only present to assist him with *1187 legal 
issues such as jury selection. Defendant requested 
that Gravis be excused because "I was told by 
[Gravis] himself that he wasn't gonna argue 
anything, he wasn't gonna do anything." The court 
granted Defendant's request and released Gravis. 
**19 Following trial, the jury convicted Defendant 
of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced 
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him to an indeterminate term of ten years to life in 
prison, to be served consecutively with a sentence 
he was already serving. Defendant appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1] **20 We address two of Defendant's 
arguments on appeal. First, Defendant argues that 
the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
under the Speedy Trial Statute. " 'We review a trial 
court's determination that a defendant's charges 
should be dismissed pursuant to the Speedy Trial 
Statute for abuse of discretion.1 " State v. 
Hankerson, 2003 UT App 433,1 7, 82 P.3d 1155 
(quoting State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 28l,1f 3, 
34 P.3d 790). "An appellate court will find abuse of 
discretion only where there is no reasonable basis in 
the record to support the trial court's Speedy Trial 
Statute determination of good cause." Id. 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
[2] [3] **21 Second, Defendant argues that he was 
denied his state and federal constitutional rights to 
counsel when the trial court determined that 
Defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 
waived his right to counsel through his conduct and 
required Defendant to represent himself at trial. 
"Whether a waiver of counsel was made knowingly 
and intelligently is a mixed question of law and 
fact." State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 
1998). "Thus, we review the trial court's factual 
findings for clear error, and its legal conclusions for 
correctness." State v. Vancleave, 2001 UT App 228, 
t 5, 29 P.3d 680 (citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Speedy Trial Statute 
[4] **22 Defendant argues that the trial court erred 
by denying his motion to dismiss under the Speedy 
Trial Statute. [FN2] When any Utah prisoner has 
an "untried indictment or information" and files a 
written demand "requesting disposition of the 
pending charge," that prisoner "shall be entitled to 
have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of 
the date of delivery" of the written demand. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999). However, a 
"reasonable continuance" to extend the statutory 
period may be granted to either party "for good 
cause shown in open court." Id. § 77-29- 1(3). 
Should the prosecutor fail to bring the charge within 
120 days, the defendant may move to dismiss the 
charge against him. See id. § 77-29- 1(4). After 
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reviewing the proceeding, "[i]f the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the 
matter heard within the time required is not 
supported by good cause, whether a previous 
motion for continuance was made or not, the court 
shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice." Id. 
FN2. The Speedy Trial Statute provides, in 
relevant part: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term 
of imprisonment in the state prison, jail or 
other penal or correctional institution of 
this state, and there is pending against the 
prisoner in this state any untried indictment 
or information, and the prisoner shall 
deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial 
officer in authority, or any appropriate 
agent of the same, a written demand 
specifying the nature of the charge and the 
court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall 
be entitled to have the charge brought to 
trial within 120 days of the date of delivery 
of written notice. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as 
required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting 
attorney or the defendant or his counsel, 
for good cause shown in open court, with 
the prisoner or his counsel being present, 
may be granted any reasonable 
continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought 
to trial within 120 days, or within such 
continuance as has been granted, and 
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss 
the action, the court shall review the 
proceeding. If the court finds that the 
failure of the prosecuting attorney to have 
the matter heard within the time required is 
not supported by good cause, whether a 
previous motion for continuance was made 
or not, the court shall order the matter 
dismissed with prejudice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999). 
*1188 [5] **23 Determining whether the trial 
court erred in denying Defendant's motion to 
dismiss pursuant to the Speedy Trial Statute 
requires a two-step analysis. See State v. Coleman, 
2001 UT App 28l,1f 6, 34 P.3d 790. "First, we 
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must determine when the 120-day period 
commenced and when it expired. Second, if the 
trial was held outside the 120-day period, we must 
then determine whether 'good cause' excused the 
delay." State v. Beaton, 958 P.2d 911, 916 (Utah 
1998). 
**24 The parties agree that the 120-day period 
commenced on April 10, 2001. Thus, the statutory 
period expired on August 8, 2001. Defendant's 
four-day trial beginning on September 30, 2002, 
was held well beyond the expiration of the 120-day 
period. Therefore, we must determine whether 
good cause excused the delay that caused 
Defendant's trial to be held beyond the statutory 
period. See id. 
[6] **25 Defendant concedes that most of the 
delays were supported by good cause but argues 
that the trial court erred when it found good cause 
to grant the State's request to continue the trial from 
December 10, 2001, to February 4, 2002. [FN3] 
We grant significant deference to a trial court's 
finding of "good cause" and "find an abuse of 
discretion only where there is no reasonable basis in 
the record to support the trial court's Speedy Trial 
Statute determination of good cause." State v. 
Hankerson, 2003 UT App 433,f 7, 82 P.3d 1155 
(quotations and citation omitted). Under this 
standard, we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it found good cause to 
delay the trial. 
FN3. Defendant asserts only that the delay 
from December 10, 2001, to February 4, 
2002-a period of 56 days—was not 
supported by good cause. In addition, 
Defendant does not challenge any trial 
delays after February 4, 2002. Thus, we 
address only the specific delay Defendant 
challenges. 
[7][8] **26 "A finding of 'good cause' that will 
excuse failure of the prosecution to bring a 
defendant to trial within the time required means (1) 
delay caused by the defendant-such as asking for a 
continuance; or (2) a relatively short delay caused 
by unforseen problems arising immediately prior to 
trial." State v. Houston, 2003 UT App 4l6,1f 11, 
82 P.3d 219 (quotations and citations omitted); see 
also State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 
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1991). Furthennore, " 'extending the trial date to a 
reasonable time outside the [120-day] period to 
accommodate, in part, defense counsel's schedule 
constitutes "good cause" under [the Speedy Trial 
Statute].' " Houston, 2003 UT App 416 at ^ 11, 82 
P.3d 219 (alterations in original) (quoting Heaton, 
958P.2dat917). 
**27 In State v. Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146, 
71 P.3d 184, the trial court had found good cause to 
delay defendant's jury trial beyond the 120-day 
period "to hear a case of higher priority." Id. at \ 
11. We reversed and remanded with instructions to 
dismiss the defendant's case with prejudice because 
good cause was not shown in open court. See id at 
1Hf 15-16. In particular, we held that the State 
had failed to request that the trial court make its 
good cause determination in open court pursuant to 
section 77-29-1(3). See id at f 15. Further, in the 
trial court's written order denying the defendant's 
motion to dismiss, the court had failed to provide 
any information regarding the higher priority case 
so that we could adequately review the good cause 
determination. See id. at ^ 16. 
**28 Unlike the trial court in Wagenman, the trial 
court in Defendant's case made a good cause 
determination in open court pursuant to section 
77-29-1(3) and made specific findings to support its 
good cause determination. In particular, the trial 
court found that good cause existed to grant the 
State's motion to continue the trial from December 
10, 2001, to February 4, 2002, because the 
prosecutor had another high priority jury trial that 
was scheduled for the same time as Defendant's 
case. The trial court found that the State requested, 
in open court, to continue the trial for the following 
reasons: (1) the other case predated Defendant's 
case; (2) the other defendant was also in custody; 
(3) the other case was a first degree murder and 
aggravated robbery case; (4) Defendant's trial 
could not be rescheduled to an earlier date because 
the State would be unable to secure out-of-state 
witnesses prior to December 10; and (5) while the 
trial court and the State were both available to try 
the case the *1189 week of January 14, 2002, 
defense counsel was available only the week of 
February 4, 2002. Thus, the trial court concluded 
that good cause existed to delay the trial until 
February 4, 2002. These facts adequately provide a 
reasonable basis for the trial court's finding of good 
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cause to grant the State's motion to continue the trial 
beyond the statutory period, and we find no abuse 
of discretion in this determination. 
**29 Furthermore, defense counsel's scheduling 
conflicts delayed resetting the trial until February 4, 
2002. Specifically, when the State moved to 
continue the trial from December 10, 2001, the trial 
court attempted to reset the trial for January 7, 2002 
and even offered to move another trial to ensure the 
trial was held in January. However, defense 
counsel informed the trial court that he had already 
scheduled trials during the weeks of January 7, 
2002, and January 14, 2002. Defense counsel 
suggested the week of January 21, 2002, and 
offered to find someone to replace him at the trial 
on January 14, but codefendant's counsel had 
scheduling conflicts both of those weeks. Thus, the 
trial was reset for February 4, 2002, in part, to 
accommodate defense counsel's schedule. See 
Houston, 2003 UT App 416 at If 11, 82 P.3d 219. 
Because the trial court found that good cause 
existed to grant the State's motion to continue, and 
because defense counsel's scheduling conflicts 
necessitated rescheduling the trial to February 
rather than January, we hold that the trial court 
properly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss. 
[FN4] 
FN4. The analysis required under the 
Speedy Trial Statute is as follows: Once a 
court determines that the trial falls outside 
the 120-day limit, it then must determine 
whether the cause for and extent of the 
delay is wholly attributable to the 
defendant. If so, then good cause exists 
and no further analysis is necessary. If not, 
then the court must engage in a more 
traditional good cause analysis to 
determine whether the extent of the delay 
attributable to others occurred for good 
cause. 
While this is the required analysis, because 
the case law may appear inconsistent 
regarding whether a good cause analysis is 
necessary when the delay beyond 120 days 
is attributable solely to a defendant, we 
briefly discuss the relevant cases. 
In State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 
1998), the defendant requested a 
preliminary hearing just ten days before 
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the trial date. See id. at 916. To 
accommodate defendant's request, the trial 
court moved the trial date and held a 
preliminary hearing instead. See id. The 
trial court then spent eighteen days 
resolving defendant's motions. See id. 
Without explicitly engaging in a traditional 
good cause analysis, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the delay effectively 
extended the 120-day deadline by eighteen 
days. See id. The court then stated that 
because the trial court had scheduled the 
trial beyond the disposition period, which 
included the eighteen-day delay 
attributable to the defendant, "we must 
proceed to step two of our inquiry to 
determine whether continuing the trial to 
accommodate, in part, defense counsel's 
schedule constitutes 'good cause1 under 
section 77-29-1." Id. 
The court did not explain why the first 
delay (related to the defendant's request for 
a preliminary hearing) did not seem to 
trigger a traditional good cause analysis, 
but the second delay (related, in part, to 
the defendant's scheduling conflicts) did 
trigger a traditional good cause analysis. 
See id. This makes it appear that the 
analysis is different for each delay. 
However, there really is no difference. 
Even though the court did not explicitly 
engage in a traditional good cause analysis 
for the first delay, it did hold that "the 
disposition period must be extended by the 
amount of time during which the prisoner 
himself creates the delay." Id. (emphasis 
added). Implicit in this holding is that 
whenever a delay can be attributed wholly 
to the defendant, good cause exists to 
extend the 120-day deadline at least to that 
extent. See State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 
115, 116 (Utah 1982) (concluding that 
where defendant's trial date was originally 
scheduled less than one month after 
defendant's request for disposition and 
court granted defendant's request for 
continuance, defendant was responsible for 
the number of days during which 
continuance was granted and could not 
include those days in disposition period). 
The fact that the Heaton court engaged in a 
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traditional good cause analysis only for the 
second delay-which was caused only in 
part by defense counsel's scheduling 
conflicts and in part by the prosecutor's 
scheduling conflicts, see 958 P.2d at 916-
does not demonstrate that the court did not 
find good cause for the first delay. The 
better reading is that while good cause is 
required for all delays beyond the 
disposition period, once the cause for and 
extent of the delay is found to be wholly 
attributable to the defendant, good cause 
exists, and no further analysis is required. 
Cases decided after Heaton are in accord. 
For instance, in State v. Coleman, 2001 
UT App 281, 34 P.3d 790, this court held 
that good cause existed to delay a trial for 
the time it took to adjudicate defendant's 
motion to dismiss, see id. at f 11, and 
defense counsel's scheduling conflicts. See 
id. at \ 18. The fact that we used the 
word "tolling," which is only 
metaphorically apt, to describe the 
additional time added to the disposition, 
see id. at \ 19 n. 14, does not change the 
fact that good cause was required and 
found. 
Also, in State v. Peterson, 2002 UT App 
53, 42 P.3d 1258, we stated that because 
the defendant caused the delay by filing a 
motion to suppress, " 'the disposition 
period [should have been] extended by the 
amount of time during which defendant 
himself ... created delay.' " Id. at \ 8 
(quoting State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 
116 (Utah 1982)) (alterations in original). 
Thus, we reversed the trial court's 
dismissal for failure to prosecute and held 
that twenty-seven days remained in the 
disposition period. See id. at "J 9. 
Although we did not explicitly engage in a 
traditional good cause analysis and we 
again used the somewhat misleading word 
"tolling," id. at \ 6, Peterson supports the 
rule that when the cause for and extent of 
the delay is wholly attributable to 
defendant, good cause exists for the delay. 
Finally, in State v. Houston, 2003 UT App 
416, 82 P.3d 219, we engaged in a 
traditional good cause analysis because 
while the delay was initially caused by 
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defense counsel's scheduling conflict, the 
extent of the delay was in part due to 
scheduling conflicts the trial court had. 
See id. at f 13. We noted that, under 
Heaton, "extending the trial date to a 
reasonable time outside the [120-day] 
period to accommodate ... defense 
counsel's schedule constitutes good cause 
under [the Speedy Trial Statute]." Id. at \ 
11 (first and third alterations in original) 
(quotations and citation omitted); accord 
State v. Hankerson, 2003 UT App 433, 82 
P.3d 1155. Because the delay was not 
unreasonable under the circumstances, 
there existed good cause for the delay. 
Houston, 2003 UT App 416 at K 13, 82 
P.3d219. 
*1190 II. Waiver of Right to Counsel 
[9][10] **30 Defendant argues that the trial court 
erred in finding that Defendant voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently waived his state [FN5] 
and federal rights to counsel through his conduct. 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution guarantees every criminal defendant 
the right to assistance of counsel as well as the right 
to self-representation. See State v. Frampton, 131 
P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987) ("In Faretta v. 
California,[ All U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 
L.Ed.2d 562 (1975),] the United States Supreme 
Court noted that the [S]ixth [A]mendment ... 
implicitly guarantees the right of a competent 
accused to represent himself, without counsel, in 
state criminal proceedings." (footnotes omitted)). 
FN5. Because Defendant does not set forth 
a separate state constitutional argument, 
we need only address the federal question. 
See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 
n. 5 (Utah 1988) ("As a general rule, we 
will not engage in state constitutional 
analysis unless an argument for different 
analyses under the state and federal 
constitutions is briefed."). 
[11][12] **31 However, "[b]ecause a defendant's 
choice of self-representation often results in 
detrimental consequences to the defendant, a trial 
court must be vigilant to assure that the choice is 
freely and expressly made 'with eyes open.' " State 
v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45^ 15, 979 P.2d 799 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
95 P.3d 1182 
95 P.3d 1182, 503 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 2004 UT App 224 
(Cite as: 95 P.3d 1182, 2004 UT App 224) 
(quoting Faretta, All U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2525). 
Thus, when there is doubt concerning the waiver 
of counsel, a presumption against waiver exists and 
any uncertainties must be resolved in the 
defendant's favor. See State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 
911, 917 (Utah 1998). 
[13][14][15] **32 To waive the right to counsel, a 
defendant must "clearly and unequivocally" request 
self-representation. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at If 16, 
979 P.2d 799 (quotations and citations omitted). 
Before honoring a defendant's decision to appear 
pro se, a trial court must determine whether that 
choice is being made voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently. See State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 
779 (Utah Ct.App.1996). However, "[t]hese 
requirements that the request to represent one's self 
be definite and voluntary do not mean ... 'that [a 
defendant's] decision to waive counsel must be 
entirely unconstrained.' " Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at \ 
17, 979 P.2d 799 (second alteration in original) 
(citations omitted). For instance, "[a] criminal 
defendant may be asked, in the interest of orderly 
procedures, to choose between waiver [of counsel] 
and another course of action as long as the choice 
presented to him is not constitutionally offensive." 
Id. (second alteration in original) (quotations and 
citations omitted). If the options presented are 
constitutionally sound, then a defendant's choice 
between or among them is voluntary. See id. at \ 
20. 
**33 There is no question that Defendant in this 
case did not explicitly request self-representation or 
waive his right to counsel. At every appearance 
before the trial court, Defendant insisted that he had 
not waived his right to counsel and demanded 
representation. The trial court repeatedly offered 
Defendant the choice between accepting the 
representation of appointed counsel, hiring private 
counsel, or self-representation. Defendant rejected 
representation from PDA because he claimed PDA 
refused to file his *1191 motions. Essentially, 
Defendant wanted counsel "strictly [to] follow 
tactics dictated by" him. Id. at If 18. 
[16] **34 After Defendant rejected PDA 
representation because counsel would not follow his 
directions by filing what the attorney deemed 
unethical motions, the trial court presented 
Defendant with the choice of retaining private 
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counsel or representing himself. While Defendant 
made some attempts to hire an attorney, these 
attempts were futile. "That [Defendant] did not 
particularly like the choice presented to him ... and 
that he did not want to proceed pro se are not 
sufficient reasons to render the choice 
constitutionally offensive." Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 
at 1f 21, 979 P.2d 799 (quotations and citations 
omitted). Therefore, "[w]e hold that the options 
offered [Defendant were constitutionally 
permissible and ... his choice, however reluctant or 
conditional, was voluntary and unambiguous." Id. 
at K 19 (emphasis added). 
[17][18][19] **35 We must next consider whether 
Defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and 
intelligent. This inquiry " 'turns upon the particular 
facts and circumstances surrounding each case.' " Id. 
at H 22 (quoting State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 
187 (Utah 1987)). The Utah Supreme Court has 
highly "recommended that the trial court conduct an 
on-the-record colloquy with the accused in which 
the court should fully inform the accused 'of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so 
that the record will establish that he knows what he 
is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' " 
[FN6] Id. at H 23 (quoting Faretta, All U.S. at 
835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541). At a minimum, the trial 
court should 
FN6. The Utah Supreme Court has 
repeatedly and strongly recommended, but 
not mandated, that trial courts address 
these areas using the sixteen-point 
colloquy set forth in State v. Frampton, 
131 P.2d 183, 187 n. 12 (Utah 1987). See 
State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,1fl[ 23-24, 
979 P.2d 799; State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 
911, 918 n. 5 (Utah 1998). 
(1) advise the defendant of his constitutional right 
to the assistance of counsel, as well as his 
constitutional right to represent himself; (2) 
ascertain that the defendant possesses the 
intelligence and capacity to understand and 
appreciate the consequences of the decision to 
represent himself, including the expectation that 
the defendant will comply with technical rules 
and the recognition that presenting a defense is 
not just a matter of telling one's story; and (3) 
ascertain that the defendant comprehends the 
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nature of the charges and proceedings, the range 
of permissible punishments, and any additional 
facts essential to a broad understanding of the 
case. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918. Here, the State concedes 
that the trial court did not engage in the requisite 
colloquy. [FN7] Thus, we must determine whether 
extraordinary circumstances exist that warrant a de 
novo review of the record. See id. Neither the 
supreme court nor this court has determined what 
extraordinary circumstances would trigger de novo 
review. However, we need not decide *1192 
whether extraordinary circumstances exist to allow 
us to look to the record as a whole to determine 
whether Defendant knowingly and intelligently 
waived his right to counsel because there is simply 
nothing in the record to persuade us that his waiver 
was knowing and intelligent. 
FN7. In fact, when prompted by the State 
to engage in a colloquy with Defendant the 
trial court refused. 
[The State]: Judge, I think that we do need 
to make a record under Heaton ... [a]nd 
explain to [Defendant] all of those things 
that are outlined under Heaton about law 
school and rules of evidence, that you 
won't help him, all of those kind of things. 
Just to make sure that ... his election to 
represent himself at the time of trial is 
voluntary and knowing. 
The Court: Well, but the problem is he 
doesn't want to represent himself... But 
every time he hires an attorney, the 
attorney said I'm not going to do 
something that's unethical, I won't 
represent you anymore. That's the problem 
we're running into. He doesn't want to 
represent himself. 
[The State]: But I think, Judge, that under 
Heaton if you go through those options 
and explain to him even absent all of those 
things, absent any of the help, if he doesn't 
have an attorney for the next trial setting 
he will be representing himself and that 
that's his election and otherwise-
The Court: Okay. But I guess the problem 
I'm having-and I understand what you're 
saying--but what good does it do to explain 
to him the disadvantages of representing 
himself? He doesn't want to represent 
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himself. But on the other side, every time 
we give him an attorney or have him hire 
an attorney, the attorney withdraws on the 
case. 
[The State]: Because then at that point you 
can force him to represent himself. 
However, the trial court failed to follow 
the State's recommendation. 
**36 We conclude that even if extraordinary 
circumstances exist warranting a de novo review, 
while Defendant voluntarily waived his right to 
counsel through his dilatory conduct, he did not do 
so knowingly and intelligently. An examination of 
the record reveals that Defendant understood that he 
had a right to the assistance of counsel, as well as a 
right to represent himself. Defendant invoked that 
right at every hearing and incessantly asserted that 
he did not want to represent himself because he was 
not capable of doing so. 
**37 Furthermore, Defendant had some 
comprehension of the procedures and practices 
involved in a criminal trial. He understood that 
counsel was necessary for preparing and arguing his 
motions, for choosing the jury, presenting argument, 
examining witnesses, subpoenaing witnesses, and 
obtaining transcripts. Thus, even though Defendant 
continually asserted that he was not capable of 
representing himself, there is some evidence in the 
record establishing that he possessed the 
intelligence and capacity to represent himself. 
However, we are not persuaded that without any 
warnings from the trial court at any time as to the 
inherent dangers of self-representation involving 
such a serious offense, that he in fact understood the 
consequences of representing himself. See id. 
**38 Furthermore, there is nothing in the record 
that would demonstrate Defendant's understanding 
of the nature of the charge against him and the 
range of possible punishments. The State argues 
that the trial court's reading of the information at 
Defendant's initial appearance is sufficient. We 
disagree. There was no indication by Defendant at 
this initial appearance that he understood the 
severity of the charge or what punishments he was 
likely facing. In fact, the record reveals that the 
clerk of the court merely read the information and 
that the trial court never engaged Defendant in a 
discussion to determine his level of understanding. 
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**39 In State v. Petty, 2001 UT App 396, 38 P.3d 
998, the trial court engaged the defendant in a 
limited colloquy but failed to address whether he 
understood the nature of the charges and 
proceedings and the range of possible punishments. 
See id. at \ 7. Because the trial court made no 
findings of fact, we examined the text of the limited 
colloquy and held that we could "discern no 
indication of [the defendant's] level of 
understanding concerning the nature of the charges 
against him, or the range of possible penalties he 
faced." Id. at ^ 11. Thus, we concluded that the 
defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive 
his right to counsel. See id. Similarly, there are no 
statements by Defendant anywhere in the record 
that would indicate that he understood the nature of 
the charge and range of possible punishments. 
"Accordingly, absent a discussion of the nature of 
the charges and the range of possible penalties 
[Defendant] faced, we cannot say that [Defendant] 
had a proper understanding of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation." Id. at f 8 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
**40 While we do not wish to reward Defendant's 
dilatory conduct, in light of the strong presumption 
against waiver, we hold that Defendant did not 
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to 
counsel. As our supreme court has recognized, 
[t]he right to have the assistance of counsel in a 
criminal trial is a fundamental constitutional right 
which must be jealously protected by the trial 
court.... "The constitutional right of an accused to 
be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the 
protection of a trial court, in which the accused— 
whose life or liberty is at stake-is without 
counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious 
and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of 
determining whether there is an intelligent and 
competent waiver by the accused." 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 (quoting *1193Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 
82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). [FN8] Therefore, we hold 
that while Defendant voluntarily waived his right to 
counsel through his conduct, he did nol do so 
knowingly and intelligently. Consequently, we 
reverse Defendant's conviction and remand for a 
new trial. 
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process had the trial judge advised 
Defendant of the dire consequences of 
refusing counsel who would not follow his 
instructions. Specifically, when Defendant 
initially indicated that he wanted Retallick 
released from his case because he refused 
to file the motions Defendant insisted be 
filed, the judge could have explained to 
Defendant the following: (1) counsel 
cannot be forced to file motions he 
believes to be frivolous; (2) if Defendant 
continues to insist that frivolous motions 
be filed and subsequent counsel is 
removed from the case, then Defendant 
would be required to represent himself; 
(3) the serious nature of the charges he is 
facing and the potential punishment; and 
(4) because of the multiple dangers and 
disadvantages involved in 
self-representation at a felony trial the 
choice to represent oneself cannot be 
undertaken lightly. While the trial judge 
did inform Defendant that he did not have 
a right to counsel of his choice from PDA 
and that he may be required to represent 
himself, the trial judge failed to inform 
Defendant of the likely perilous 
repercussions of self-representation. 
CONCLUSION 
**41 We conclude that the trial court properly 
denied Defendant's motion to dismiss under the 
Speedy Trial Act. However, we hold that the trial 
court erred in finding that the Defendant knowingly 
and intelligently waived his right to counsel. 
Accordingly, we reverse Defendant's conviction and 
remand for a new trial. 
**42 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, 
Associate Presiding Judge and WILLIAM A. 
THORNE JR., Judge. 
95 P.3d 1182, 503 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 2004 UT 
App 224 
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FN8. We note that this problem could have 
been constitutionally solved early in the 
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Addendum B 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 








76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping. 
(1) A person commit^ aggravated kidnaping if the person intentionally or 
knowingly, without authority of law and against the will of the victim, by any 
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, or transports the victim: 
(a) and in committing, attempting to commit, or in the immediate flight 
after the attempt or commission of the kidnaping, the actor possesses, 
uses, ot threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; or 
(b) with intent: 
(i) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to 
compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear 
from engaging in particular conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight 
after commission or attempted commission of a felony; 
(iii) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; 
(iv) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or 
political function; or 
(v) to commit a sexual offense as described in Part 4 of this chapter. 
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the result of force, threat, or deceit 
if the victim is mentally incompetent or younger than 16 years and the 
detention or moving is accomplished without the effective consent of the 
victim's custodial parent, guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the 
victim. 
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a first degree felony punishable by imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term of not less than 6, 10, or 15 years and which 
may be for life. Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 
76-3-406. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-302, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-302; 1974, ch. 32, § 12; 
1983, ch. 88, § 15; 1995, ch. 337, § 4; 1995 
(1st S.S.), ch. 10, § 5; 1996, ch. 40, § 6; 1998, 
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him for a second about that. But I just don't trust anybody, 
you know. I think they're all out to get me because I — 
they say that we have these rights. The United States of 
America says we have rights, yet I've not been able to have 
any of my rights here. I don't understand it. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll deny your motion to 
dismiss. The other thing that I pointed out before, too, I 
really think your remedy is that if you think Ms. Neider is 
guilty of some kind of misconduct you can contact the Bar 
Association. I don't think the remedy is to dismiss the 
case. 
Now let's go to the last motion, Mr. Pedockie, and that's 
the motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. Again, 
I've had a chance to read through the memorandum and also the 
state's response. Anything you want to say about that? 
MR. PEDOCKIE: Yes. I don't have the paperwork here 
handy, but in her motion of objection she says that there was 
a postponement from May — 
MR. GRAVIS: She's not saying a postponement, but 
that the time was running from May 25th to July 12th. 
MR. PEDOCKIE: And then from July 12th to August 
1st — from July 12th to August 1st she shows no time 
running, yet I don't understand that due to the fact that 
court wasn't even — trial wasn't even set until August 13th. 
And, yes, there was a continuance on August 1st so how could 
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1 the clock stop until August 1st? 
2 MR. GRAVIS: They tried to set it earlier and Mr. 
3 Boyle was not available to do the trial in July. 
4 MR. PEDOCKIE: And they tried to set another time 
5 and the state wasnTt ready also. So they came to a mutual 
6 agreement that August 13th was the date. I guess he's 
7 trying — they're saying that my lawyer wasn't ready, but yet 
8 the state wasn't also ready, so they came to a mutual 
9 agreement that August 13th would be the trial date. I 
10 believe it was August 13th, 14th, 15th, skipped, and then 
11 went to the 17th. I'm not sure. Like I said, I don't have 
12 my papers handy right now. 
13 But in the preliminary hearing, pages 174 through 177, 
14 you can clearly see that you guys all made agreements on 
15 August 13th was the trial date. Yet she has postponement on 
16 me from July 12th to August 1st, which my time should have 
17 been running at that time. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else on that? 
19 MR. PEDOCKIE: Other than that, there was a 
20 postponement on our behalf and then we were ready in 
21 December. She postponed it in December for grounds of good 
22 cause, I believe. It says right here it was postponed from 
23 November 20th and it wasn't postponed until December -- I 
24 think December or -- I can't remember exactly, but it was 





























trial, January or February, and I wasn't present 
, which I believe was another Utah State right, 
United States of America right, or whatever you want to 









I wasn't even there at that time. Which when 
it's clearly over my 120 days now. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 
MR. PEDOCKIE: I don't think so. I know that 
I don't understand. I believe, and I'd like to 
my attorney, it is my right to be present at any court 
hearings 
how — I 
yet -- I 
, isn't it? 
MR. GRAVIS: Generally, yeah. 
ask 
MR. PEDOCKIE: All right. So I was just wondering 
filed this and it's been over my 120 days, but 
don't understand how they could go over my 120 
and me not be present in court and postpone it again. 
say? 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else you want 
MR. PEDOCKIE: No. 
THE COURT: Does the state want to respond? 
MS. NEIDER: I think that, as outlined in the 
memoranda, the dates are consistent with what the record 
reflects 
request 































that date of July 12th, Mr. Boyle said he couldn!t try it. 
The case law is clear that if it's to accommodate defense 
counsel's schedule that that's part of the consideration, 
that it does not — the time does not run against the state. 
In addition, that date in January that he's referring to 
that he may not have been present for, at the time that we 
continued the trial on November 28th Mr. Retallick indicated 
that he had another case that may go in January and so we had 
a backup date of February. So Mr. Pedockie was present when 
we talked about both of those dates. I think Mr. Retallick 
reported to the court that he was unable to make that January 
date so we used the backup date of February 4th. That's why 
that time -- he was present and was aware that that was a 
possibility, that if Mr. Retallick's other case went he would 
be moved to the February 4th date. 
Frankly I'm not sure it matters since on January 23rd he 
fired Mr. Retallick and asked him to be taken off the case 
and that he was going to hire Mr. Brass. I think under 
constitutional provisions his right to a speedy trial has not 
been infringed upon or abridged and the state has complied 
with the statutory provisions under the 120 detainer. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Mr. Pedockie? 
MR. PEDOCKIE: Yes. On this it was clear that she 
said I was present on both things. I was not present. In 
fact, I believe it even says in here that I was not present, 
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1 but I was present on the other one. I was not present on one 
2 of them, I know for a fact. I would have clearly objected to 
3 that. 
4 Also, it wasn't -- it was a mutual -- I don't understand 
5 how they cannot proceed until August 1st due to the fact that 
6 you guys sat here in the preliminary hearing, and we have it 
7 in black and white on pages, like I said, 174 through 176, 
8 that you yourself, Your Honor, said that this date will go. 
9 That it should meet the 120 days. And Mrs. Neider agreed 
10 with it, so did Boyle. And then come to the fact on August 
11 1st it was postponed, which I understand that, which is in my 
12 defense. So all that time is dead time. And then the next 
13 time was her's showing for good cause. 
14 But then when it was postponed again, due to the fact 
15 that Retallick postponed it, I feel that I should have been 
16 present at the time, because I clearly would have objected to 
17 that. At the time I wanted my 120 days, you know. The only 
18 time that -- I just feel that the time periods that she's 
19 saying are not right. It doesn't jive with the preliminary 






I'd be able to show you those also, Your Honor. You yourself 
said that it should meet the 120 days as long as we get it in 
before August 13th, or whatever it was, you know what I mean? 




























THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pedockie, I want to take 
a few minutes and walk through the history of the case so at 
least we have a record as far as what I show on my — as I 
look through the record of this case. 
I show that you were charged with this crime, aggravated 
kidnapping, back on February 9th of 2001. The case was 
assigned originally to Judge Pam Heffernan. You were then 
arraigned on the 20th of February, 11 days later, here in 
Weber County. The public defender's office was appointed to 
represent you. 
Initially Mike Bouwhuis was assigned to represent you on 
the case. He conflicted out because of a conflict. It was 
then assigned to Mike Boyle. Then the prelim was set 
originally for March the 20th, which was a month after the 
arraignment. Mr. Boyle moved to have the case continued, 
claiming that he wasn't prepared and ready to go. So then 
they scheduled it for a special setting for a prelim on the 
13th of April. 
One week before that, before the 13th of April, Judge 
Heffernan recused herself, saying she couldn't handle the 
case, and the case was then assigned to me. Of course we 
couldn't do the prelim on the 13th because the case had been 
reassigned. 
On the 10th of April you filed your disposition for 
detainer. The notice was received at the prison and here in 
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1 the district court on the 18th of April. On the 19th of 
2 April we had a phone conference with you and your attorney at 
3 that time, Mr. Boyle, to try and set this for a preliminary 
4 hearing. We scheduled the prelim on—May—25rtb—of 2 00-1— Pfc-
5 was held on that day. Mr. Boyle represented you and you were 
6 bound over to stand trial. 
7 At that time we tried to schedule a trial for you. I 
8 offered as the first setting on this case a trial date of 
9 July 12th, 2001. Mr. Boyle said he couldn't do it on that 
10 date because of a conflict in his schedule. We ultimately 
11 agreed the first trial setting was to be August 13th, 2001. 
12 Then, a couple of weeks before, we had a pretrial conference 
13 on the 1st of August. Mr. Boyle again asked for a 
14 continuance on the case. He said that he couldn't go to 
15 trial on the 13th of August date. Instead he wanted to use 
16 that date to argue some motions, and I think we did do that 









We then scheduled your second trial. That was for the 
December date, the December 10th date. Then on the 29th of 
November we had a pretrial conference, which was about two 
weeks before trial. At that time Mr. Boyle withdrew from the 
case and Mr. Retallick replaced him at that time. 
I thought this was interesting, because at that point you 
were insisting on going to trial on that December 10th date 
even though you!d now been assigned a new attorney. Mr. 
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1 Retallick said Ifll be ready to try the case. I donft think 
2 he could have been ready, not when we assign him a case of a 
3 first degree nature. But he said Ifll be ready to go to 
4 trial. 
5 At that point the state asked for a continuance 
6 indicating that Ms. Neider had another case, a murder case, 
7 an older case, one that had been pending for trial for some 
8 time, State versus Cochran. It had been filed before your 
9 case was ever filed. I heard the arguments at that time. 
10 And by the way, Mr. Cochran was also in custody as were you. 
11 You objected to the continuance, or Mr. Retallick did for 
12 you. The court found good cause to grant the continuance. 
13 We had two trials set essentially at the same time. I found 
14 that there was good cause because the Cochran case was a 
15 little older and it was a murder case. So at that point I 
16 granted the continuance and found that there was good cause 
17 existing to continue your trial. 
18 I then offered you -- I believe you were there at that 
19 time, that pretrial conference on the 29th of November. You 
20 were the one that was so emphatic with Mr. Retallick that we 
21 go to trial on that December date. 
22 MR. PEDOCKIE: In fact I wanted to go to trial on 
23 August 13th and Boyle said there was no way he could be 
24 ready. The state said they wouldn!t be ready due to the fact 



























So I just told -- it was my mistake to even postpone it 
because it would have been -- but I was ready to go on August 
13th also. 
THE COURT: All right. So we had the trial date in 
August then the one in December. Then at that November 
pretrial conference I offered your attorney a trial date of 
January 14th. Mr. Retallick said he wouldn't be available 
that date. We ultimately set a trial on February the 4th of 
2002, which now is the third time the case has been set. 
On January 23rdr at the pretrial conference a couple of 
weeks before the trial, you appeared and you asked at that 
point to fire Mr. Retallick. You said you wanted Ed Brass to 
represent you. You said you couldn't be ready to go to trial 
on that February 4th date. The state objected. They said 
we're ready to go, we want to proceed. They objected. I 
granted the continuance over the state's objection. 
Then a week later, on the 30th of January, an attorney 
named Scott Williams appeared in court for Mr. Brass 
concerning that February 4th date. He said we can't be ready 
to try this case on the 4th. The state objected, saying they 
were ready to proceed, but I granted the continuance anyway. 
We then scheduled a trial for April 15th. This is now the 
fourth trial setting on the case. 
Three days before the trial was set Mr. Brass files a 



























claiming there was a conflict. The next day, on the 10th, we 
have a phone conference between you, myself, and you were 
down at the prison. And we had Mr. Brass on the phone and 
the prosecutor on the phone. Mr. Brass asked to withdraw 
from the case because of a conflict. The state objected. 
They wanted to proceed. I granted the continuance at the 
defense ' s request 
of the case. 
for a continuance. So now Mr. Brass is out 
Then on May 1st, which is about three weeks later, you 
appear in court. 
who your attorney 
to hire a lawyer. 
I said to you back in April, I need to know 
is going to be. You said I need some time 
I said I'll give you three weeks. 
So then you are in my courtroom on May 1st. You ask 
again, saying I need more time to hire an attorney. You say 
you're looking at an attorney out of Provo named Sheldon 
Carter. I give you two more weeks at that time. We go to 
the 21st of May. 
attorney, but now 
You appear in court and still don't have an 
this time you saw I may hire Paul Grant. I 
then reappoint the public defender's office as standby 
[counsel to represent you and tell you you can hire Mr. Grant 
if you want. We then schedule this trial date. Here we are 
at the end of May 
30th of September 
Then on July ; 
heard here today, 
and we're scheduling a trial date for the 
That is the fifth trial setting. 
1st you file the motions that we've just 



























least by my count we've had this case set five different 
times. We had the August 13th date of 2001, which was 
continued by Mr. Boyle. We had a December 10th, 2001 date, 
continued at the request of the state. We had February 4th, 
2002, continued by the defendant. April 15th, 2002, 
continued by the defendant. And now this fifth setting, 
September 30th, 2002. 
In addition to those five settings, I show that the court 
has offered you two other trial dates, both of which were 
rejected by your attorneys. July 12th, 2001 and January 
14th, 2002. Your attorneys said at those times that they 
couldn't be ready on those dates. 
I show you've had at least two judges assigned to this 
case. Now the case has been assigned to me. I show at least 
six different attorneys involved in this case. It started 
off with Mr. Bouwhuis, who recused himself. Then Mike Boyle, 
who stepped down. James Retallick, who you fired. Ed Brass, 
who asked to withdraw. Paul Grant, who entered an appearance 
but never appeared in court, and then filed a motion to 
withdraw. And maybe Sheldon Carter, who never has filed any 
kind of a motion to appear. 
So, based on the history of the case, and for the second 
time, I'm going to deny the motion for dismissal for speedy 
trial. 
MR. PEDOCKIE: On that, Your Honor, on August 1st 
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1 the prosecutor is the one that said the date of December 
2 10th. Yet back then we wanted to go sooner than that. We 
3 wanted to go sooner and she said that there was no way. The 
4 only time that was available was December 10th. I don!t 
5 understand why would she say this clear back in August due to 
6 the fact that she didn't have no other time to do this, this 
7 is the only time? 
8 THE COURT: My recollection is that on August 1st, 
9 when we set the December date, she was not here. Another 
10 attorney was here representing the state who had her 
11 calendar. We went ahead and set that and as soon as she 
12 realized that she couldnTt meet that date thatfs when we had 
13 the other hearing. 
14 MR. PEDOCKIE: No, she was here that day. In fact, 
15 she's the one that on August 1st said she needed the time to 
16 get her witnesses out of other states. And she also said 
17 that it was brought to her attention by her client that there 
18 might be threatening statements or whatever, I can't remember 
19 exactly. And that she might bring other charges against me 
20 also on that date. 
21 THE COURT: But even if that's true, Mr. Pedockie, 
22 you've now — Mr. Boyle has withdrawn from the case in late 
23 November. We appointed Mr. Retallick. There is no way that 
24 Mr. Retallick could have been ready to try that case in ten 



























he said that the defense was ready to proceed is because you 
insisted on going to trial on that date. In all honesty I 
don't think he could have been prepared to represent you, at 
least adequately. He could have gone through the motions, 
but to put an attorney on a case and expect him to be ready 
to go on a first degree felony in ten days, I just think 
that's too much. 
But because you said to him I want to go to trial on that 
date we made a record that you objected to the continuance. 
I granted the continuance not because Mr. Retallick could or 
could not be ready to go, but because the state had another 
case that was older and involved a murder case. 
MR. PEDOCKIE: Which I don't understand, because on 
August 1st she's the one that — we wanted to go before this 
and she says there's no openings until December 10th. She's 
the one that was — that set that date. 
THE COURT: No. August 13th was your first trial 
setting. Your attorney asked to have it continued in a 
pretrial hearing. 
MR. PEDOCKIE: Yeah. And we wanted to go before the 
December date. Then the prosecutor is the one that says the 
only time I have is December 10th. She set the date up, but 
yet when the date comes — why would she set a date up, a 
time to go to trial — you even asked how many days do you 



























time. Why would she go about setting a trial date up when 
she knows sh< 
THE 
e has another case at that time? 
COURT: All right. I guess my feeling is we 
argued this back in November, because you said your 120 days 
would be up. 
we had was a 
I found good cause to continue your case. What 
situation where two defendants were in custody. 
Both were facing fairly serious charges. A first degree for 
you and a mu: 
can try both 
decision, wh. 
trder case for Mr. Cochran. There is no way she 
cases at the same time. I had to make a 
Lch case will I continue. Of course, itfs pretty 
obvious I had to continue yours because Mr. Cochranfs case 
was older. 
MR. 
was present < 
THE 
Et had been pending longer than yours had. 
PEDOCKIE: And after that you're saying that I 
at all the dates, which I was not. 
COURT: Well, I don't recall ever setting any 
kind of a trial date on any of your cases that you weren't 
here for. 
MR. PEDOCKIE: Mr. Boyle — not Mr. Boyle. Mr. 




back at the 
I was not present. 
COURT: Which date do you claim that took place? 
PEDOCKIE: I have it in all of my legal work 
Utah State Prison. It was in January sometime. 
I wasnTt present at that time. 



























where Mr. Pedockie was here. Mr. Retallick was to report 
back to the court. And he reported back and said he couldn't 
do the January date but could do the February one. 
MR. PEDOCKIE: And I would have clearly objected. 
Isn't it my right to be present at everything? 
THE COURT: You have the right to be here for 
anything that is critical in terms of a trial proceeding. 
MR. PEDOCKIE: I feel that that was critical due to 
the fact that I would have objected. 
THE COURT: My recollection is that in November, 
when we were resetting this case, we bumped the December 
date. I said to Mr. Retallick, there's two dates available. 
You were here at that time. 
MR. PEDOCKIE: And I told you that --
THE COURT: I said I can give you January 14th or 
February 4th. Mr. Retallick said I'll have to get back to 
you. He came back and said I can do February 4th. 
MR. PEDOCKIE: And at that time I objected because I 
wanted to get it done. That's why I said if he would have 
set another trial date I would have objected. I feel that I 
should have been present when it was postponed again. 
THE COURT: You fired him. We never got to the 
February trial date because you fired him on the 23rd. 
MR. PEDOCKIE: But before then he postponed it 





























in court when there was a postponement. And I 




would have objected to it in January, I 





COURT: Okay. Anything else from the s 





COURT: All right. Anything else you want to 
PEDOCKIE: I just want to go over the time frame 







once waived my rights and it took them so many 
to get me into a preliminary hearing. Where in 
code it says when you1re incarcerated you have 
to get in front of the preliminary hearing also 
THE COURT: Like I say, the case has been s 

















COURT: The fifth setting is still coming. 
PEDOCKIE: When I was sittin1 there -- when I 
there were several times that my preliminary 
1t until about six or eight months after 
s way over 120 days, which is my legal right. 
THE 
gned on 
COURT: Your prelim was May 25th. You 































IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
k -k k -k k 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
ROBERT B. PEDOCKIE, 
DEFENDANT. 
MAR 2 8 2003 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
CASE NO. 011900689 
***** 
TRIAL - VOLUME 1 OF 4 
SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 
HONORABLE PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
k k k k k 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE STATE: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
& o 
rs: o 

















JURY SELECTION P. 21 
OPENING STATEMENTS 
MS. NEIDER 106 
MR. PEDOCKIE 12 9 
JEANETTE NICOLE SATHER 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 135 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 216 
1) OGDEN, UTAH SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 
2) THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. GOOD MORNING. 
3) MS. NEIDER: MORNING, JUDGE. 
4) THE COURT: LET THE RECORD REFLECT THIS IS THE TIME SET 
5) FOR TRIAL IN THE MATTER OF STATE OF UTAH VERSUS ROBERT 
6) PEDOCKTE. AND HERE ON BEHALF OF THE STATE, MS. NEIDER? 
7) MS. NEIDER: YES, JUDGE. 
8) THE COURT: AND LET'S SEE, WE HAVE MR. PEDOCKJE HERE 
9) REPRESENTING HIMSELF. AND WE ALSO HAVE MR. GRAVIS HERE AS 
10) STANDBY COUNSEL. DID YOU GET A LIST OF JURORS? 
11) MR. GRAVIS: WE HAVE A LIST OF JURORS. 
12) THE COURT: LIST OF THOSE. STATE HAVE A LIST OF THE 
13) JURORS? 
14) MS. NEIDER: YES, JUDGE. 
15) THE COURT: AND DID YOU ALSO GET A LIST OF THE 20 
16) QUESTIONS THAT I USUALLY ASK THE JURY? 
17) MS. NEIDER: IDIDNT GET THAT, JUDGE. 
18) THE COURT: OKAY. HOW ABOUT YOU, MR. PEDOCKJE, DID YOU 
19) GET A LIST OF THOSE QUESTIONS? 
20) MR. PEDOCKJE: NO, I DID NOT. 
21) THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYTHING WE NEED TO TAKE UP 
22) BEFORE WE BRING IN THE JURY? LETS HAVE THE RECORD REFLECT 
23) THE JURY PANEL IS NOT PRESENT. MR. PEDOCKJE, ANYTHING WE 
24) NEED TO TAKE UP? 
25) MR. PEDOCKJE: YES, YOUR HONOR. I'M NOT EDUCATED OR I'M 
1) NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURES. I 
2) DONT KNOW HOW MANY CHALLENGES I HAVE. AND IT> ALSO LIKE TOv 
3) HAVE IT ON RECORD THAT I - 1 TRIED TO CONTACT MR. GRAVIS 
4) HERE TO HAVE MY WITNESSES SUBPOENAED SO I COULD HAVE 
5) WITNESSES HERE. YET THIS IS EXACT WORDS AS I WAS TOLD THAT 
6) HE DOES NOT DO THAT. HIS SECRETARY MORE LESS TOLD ME HE 
7) WASN'T DOING THAT. HE'S JUST HERE SO MORE LESS I DONT STICK 
8) MY FOOT IN MY MOUTH -
9) THE COURT: THATS RIGHT. 
10) MR. PEDOCKJE: -BENEFIT YOU. BUT YET, THERE'S NO WAY 
11) THAT I'M CAPABLE OF GIVING ANY SUBPOENAS. I DONT EVEN KNOW 
12) HOW TO SUBPOENA -
13) THE COURT: WELL, SEE, AND THATS THE WHOLE PROBLEM WITH 
14) THIS, MR. PEDOCKJE. I THINK YOU'VE STARTING TO REALIZE THAT 
15) IT IS NOT TO YOUR ADVANTAGE TO REPRESENT YOURSELF. TRIALS 
16) ARE WAY TOO COMPLICATED, ESPECIALLY CRIMINAL CASES, FOR A 
17) DEFENDANT TO REPRESENT HIMSELF, BUT THATS TRUE, MR. GRAVIS 
18) DOESN'T REPRESENT YOU. HE'S STANDBY COUNSEL. HE'S APPOINTED 
19) HERE BY THE COURT TO ASSIST YOU IN LEGAL ISSUES, BUT HE 
20) DOESNT REPRESENT YOU IN THE SENSE THAT HE'LL SERVE SUBPOENAS 
21) OR DO ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE. HE'S JUST GONNA GIVE YOU 
22) LEGAL ADVICE. HE'LL HELP YOU WITH THE JURY SELECTION 
23) PROCESS. 
24) MR. PEDOCKJE: SEE YOU - EARLIER I ASKED FOR EVIDENCE 
25) AND MY - ALL THE DISCOVERY, EVERYTHING, YET THE PROSECUTOR 
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1) HAS NOT GIVEN ME ANY DISCOVERY, ANY EVIDENCE, ANYTHING 
2) WHATSOEVER WHICH IS - HOW CAN I BUILD A CASE OR DEFEND 
3) MYSELF WITHOUT ANY OF THIS ALSO. AND THEN NOT - LIKE I SAID 
4) ON TOP OF THAT, YOU'RE TELLING ME I HAD TO GO THROUGH 
5) MR. GRAVIS -
6) THE COURT: NO -
7) MR. PEDOCKJE: ~ GRAVIS'SECRETARY-
8) THE COURT: - YOU DONT HAVE TO GO THROUGH MISTER -
9) MR. GRAVIS IS STANDBY COUNSEL. HE DOES NOT REPRESENT YOU. 
10) AS I SAID BEFORE, HE'S APPOINTED BY THE COURT TO ASSIST YOU 
11) ON LEGAL ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, YOU SAY YOU DONT KNOW HOW 
12) MANY JURORS YOU'RE GONNA SEAT. THERE'S GONNA BE NINE JURORS 
13) ON THIS CASE. YOU'LL HAVE A CHANCE TO DO A PEREMPTORY 
14) CHALLENGE FOR FOUR, PLUS ONE ALTERNATE, SO YOU CAN STRIKE UP 
15) TO FIVE PEREMPTORILY, OKAY? 
16) MR.PEDOCKIE: I HAVE NO CLUE WHAT YOU JUST SAID. 
17) THE COURT: I KNOW YOU DONT BECAUSE THATS - YOU DONT 
18) KNOW WHAT YOU'RE DOING. BUT WE'VE ALREADY BEEN THROUGH THIS 
19) A MILLION TIMES. I TOLD YOU ITS NOT TO YOUR ADVANTAGE TO 
20) REPRESENT YOURSELF, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, I THINK THIS IS 
21) EXACTLY WHAT YOU WANT. EVERY TIME I APPOINT AN ATTORNEY, 
22) EVERY TIME YOU HIRE A LAWYER, THE ATTORNEY IS EITHER FIRED BY 
23) YOU OR ASKED TO STEP DOWN FROM THE CASE. AND I CANT HAVE 
24) THIS GO ON ANY LONGER. WE'VE HAD FIVE TRIAL SETTINGS NOW. 
25) THIS CASE IS A YEAR AND NINE MONTHS OLD. THE STATE IS 
1) ENTITLED TO GO FORWARD ALSO. BUT IT DOESNT DO ME ANY GOOD 
2) TO APPOINT AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT YOU BECAUSE YOU JUST FIRE 
3) THEM BECAUSE YOU DONT LIKE THE ADVICE THEY'RE GIVING YOU, 
4) S O -
5) MR PEDOCKJE: I'VE ONLY FIRED ONE ATTORNEY, YOUR HONOR. 
6) THE OTHER ONE HAD A CONFLICT BECAUSE THEY WERE REPRESENTING 
7) THE STATE'S CLIENT, SO -
8) THE COURT: WELL, AND THATS WHAT I SAY, THE ATTORNEY 
9) YOU FIRED WAS -
10) MR. PEDOCKJE: - AND THE NEXT ONE THE COURTS FIRED MIKE 
11) BOYLE DUE TO THE FACT HE HAS CLASS ACTIONS LAWSUITS -
12) THE COURT: NO. MR BOYLE LEFT THE PUBLIC DEFENDERS' 
13) OFFICE-
14) MR. PEDOCKJE: WHATEVER THAT HAPPENED, THEN JAMES 
15) RETALLICK. OTHER THAN THAT-
16) THE COURT: RIGHT. 
17) MR. PEDOCKJE: ~1HAVENT DID NOTHING. 
18) THE COURT: BUT YOU DIDNT JUST FIRE MR. RETALLICK. YOU 
19) FIRED THE ENTIRE PUBLIC DEFENDERS' OFFICE. YOU SAID, I DONT 
20) WANNA BE REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC DEFENDERS. SO THAT LEFT 
21) YOU WITH THE OPTION OF EITHER REPRESENTING YOURSELF OR HIRING 
22) A PRIVATE ATTORNEY. YOU HIRED ED BRASS. WE GOT READY TO TRY 
23) THE CASE. MR. BRASS CALLED AND SAID, JUDGE, I WANNA WITHDRAW 
24) FROM THE CASE. I CANT REPRESENT MR PEDOCKJE. I THEN TOLD 
25) YOU, YOU CAN HIRE ANYBODY YOTIWA-NTT T aAVF vni T AMOTTTPT? 
1) CONTINUANCE, BUT I TOLD YOU WE'RE GONNA GO TO TRIAL ON THIS 
2) CASE ON SEPTEMBER 30TH. YOU'VE NEVER HIRED ANYONE. 
3) MR. PEDOCKIE: YOUR HONOR, I DID NOT SAY THAT I DIDN'T 
4) WANT ANYBODY FROM THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION. IN FACT, 
5) I ASKED FOR ONE AFTER ED BRASS - OR ACTUALLY, I THINK IT WAS 
6) PAUL GRANT. 
7) THE COURT: WELL, THERE'S ANOTHER ONE, PAUL GRANT -
8) MR. PEDOCKIE: AND I DID NOT FIRE HIM ALSO. 
9) THE COURT: WELL, HE FILED A NOTICE WITHDRAWING FROM THE 
10) CASE, S O -
11) MR. PEDOCKIE: YEAH. 
12) THE COURT: WELL, I'M GONNA FIND, SIR, THAT YOU'VE 
13) KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED YOUR RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY 
14) IN THIS MATTER -
15) MR. PEDOCKIE: AND I WANT IT ON RECORD THAT I HAVE NOT 
16) THE COURT: OKAY. THATS FINE, YOU'VE GOT THE BENEFIT 
17) OF THE RECORD-
18) MR. PEDOCKIE: I DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE LAW NOR-
19) THE COURT: YOU DONT, SIR -
20) MR. PEDOCKIE: - DO I - YOU KNOW WHAT I MEAN, AND -
21) THE COURT: - AND MY SUGGESTION IS THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE 
22) HAD AN ATTORNEY, BUT YOU JUST KEEP PLAYING GAMES WITH US -
23) MR. PEDOCKIE: AND THATS WHY I SAID, TVE ASKED FOR AN 
24) ATTORNEY. IVOKE MY SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT SEVERAL TIMES. 
25) THE COURT: THATS RIGHT, AND EVERY TIME WE GIVE YOU AN 
1) ATTORNEY, YOU END UP FIRING THE ATTORNEY OR THE ATTORNEY 
2) WITHDRAWS, AND THIS CANT GO ON FOREVER. 
3) MR. PEDOCKIE: THE ONLY ONE THAT I'VE - I'M NOT GONNA 
4) SIT HERE AND ARGUE. I DON'T WANNA SIT HERE AND ARGUE. WE'VE 
5) BEEN OVER IT A HUNDRED TIMES. IF YOU'RE DENYING ME ACCESS TO 
6) COUNSEL, I'D LUCE TO HAVE THAT ON RECORD -
7) THE COURT: ITS ON RECORD -
8) MR. PEDOCKIE: - THAT YOU'RE DENYING ME ACCESS TO 
9) COUNSEL. 
10) THE COURT: - AND YOU'VE GOT THE BENEFIT OF THE RECORD. 
11) NOW, MR. PEDOCKIE, I ALSO SUGGEST TO YOU THAT YOU NOT MENTION 
12) THIS TO THE JURY. THE JURY CANT HELP YOU ON THIS QUESTION. 
13) THIS IS A LEGAL MATTER. AND SO MY SUGGESTION TO YOU IS THAT 
14) YOU NOT BRING IT UP IN FRONT OF THE JURY. ITS NOT GONNA 
15) HELP YOUR CASE AT ALL TO MENTION THIS TO THE JURY. THIS IS A 
16) LEGAL ISSUE. YOU'VE HAD IT - PUT IT ON THE RECORD TIME AND 
17) TIME AGAIN THAT YOU WANT AN ATTORNEY. ITS THERE, ITS ON 
18) THE RECORD, BUT I WOULDN'T MENTION IT TO THE JURY. 
19) MR. PEDOCKIE: I FEEL THAT ITS THE JURY'S RIGHT TO KNOW 
20) THAT I'M -
21) THE COURT: OKAY. 
22) MR. PEDOCKIE: - BEING - I'M REPRESENTING MYSELF NOT 
23) IN MY OWN BEHALF -
24) THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND THATS FINE, SIR. I WANT 
25) YOU TO UNDERSTAND IF THATS WHAT YOU WANNA DO, THE JURY'S 
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1) ALSO GONNA FIND OUT HOW MANY TIMES THIS CASE HAS BEEN SET FOR 
2) TRIAL-
3) MR. PEDOCKIE: THATS FINE. 
4) THE COURT: - AND WHATS HAPPENED EVERY TIME WE'VE SET 
5) IT FOR TRIAL, AND THE MESSAGE THATS GONNA COME ACROSS TO 
6) THIS JURY, SIR, IS THAT YOU'RE PLAYING GAMES WITH THE SYSTEM, 
7) S O -
8) MR. PEDOCKIE: THATS -
9) THE COURT: - 1 JUST WANNA BE ABLE TO WARN YOU -
10) MR. PEDOCKIE: I HAVE NO CONFLICT OF LETTING THEM SEE 
11) THAT BECAUSE, LIKE I SAID, ITS IN BLACK AND WHITE THAT I'VE 
12) NOT FIRED ALL - ANY - ANY OF 'EM. 
13) THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. NOW -
14) MR. PEDOCKIE: BESIDES MAYBE RETALLICK. 
15) THE COURT: OKAY. 
16) MR. PEDOCKIE: AND THATS WHEN I HIRED ED BRASS. 
17) THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE OTHER THING IS, SIR, IF YOU 
18) HAVE ANY EXHIBITS THAT YOU WANT A WITNESS TO LOOK AT DURING 
19) THIS - THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL, YD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU'D 
20) HAND THE EXHIBIT TO THE BAILIFF AND THE BAILIFF WILL GIVE 
21) THAT TO THE WITNESS. I DONT WANT YOU APPROACHING ANY OF THE 
22) WITNESSES OKAY? I DONT WANT YOU WANDERING AROUND THE 
23) COURTROOM. OKAY? JUST STAY WHERE YOU ARE AT THE TABLE. 
24) WE'VE GOT A RECORDER HERE, A COURT REPORTER. ITS BEING 
1) COURTROOM. OKAY? 
2) ALSO, ON VOIR DIRE, ON JURY SELECTION, IF YOU HAVE ANY 
3) QUESTIONS THAT YOU WANT POSED TO THE JURY, I NEED THOSE IN 
4) WRITING. I'M NOT GONNA LET THE ATTORNEYS OR YOU ASK 
5) QUESTIONS OF THE JURY PANEL. 
6) MR. PEDOCKIE: WELL, IF YOU'RE GONNA MAKE ME REPRESENT 
7) MYSELF, I FEEL THAT I SHOULD HAVE THAT ADEQUATE ACCESS TO THE 
8) SAME THING AS MRS. NEIDER HERE -
9) THE COURT. WHICH IS WHAT? 
10) MR. PEDOCKIE: - AND I DO HAVE A RIGHT TO ASK 
11) QUESTIONS. 
12) THE COURT: NO, YOU DONT HAVE A RIGHT TO ASK QUESTIONS. 
13) IF YOU WANNA WRITE QUESTIONS DOWN AND GIVE 'EM TO ME, I'LL 
14) DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT THEY'RE APPROPRIATE QUESTIONS AND I'LL 
15) PUT THE QUESTION TO THE JURY PANEL. I DONT HAVE ANY TROUBLE 
16) WITH THAT AS LONG AS ITS AN APPROPRIATE QUESTION. BUT I'M 
17) NOT GONNA LET EITHER SIDE ASK THE JURY ANY QUESTIONS. SO IF 
18) YOU'VE GOT QUESTIONS -
19) MR. PEDOCKIE. OH, I MEAN - 1 THOUGHT TO PICK THE 
20) JURIES. 
21) THE COURT. THATS RIGHT. DURING JURY SELECTION, I'M 
22) NOT GONNA HAVE EITHER MS. NEIDER OR YOURSELF ASKING THE JURY 
23) ANY QUESTIONS. IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY PANEL 
24) MR. PEDOCKIE: SO WHAT DO I DO, SIT UP HERE -
1) MR.PEDOCKIE: - AND MAKE A SCANDAL AND MOCKERSY OF 
2) THIS WHOLE CASE, THEN THATS -
3) THE COURT: SIR, THERE'S NOTHING IN THE - THERE'S 
4) NOTHING IN THE LAW THAT SAYS YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO QUESTION THE 
5) JURY PANEL. AND THATS WHY I SAID TO YOU, IF YOU REMEMBER, 
6) THREE WEEKS AGO, SIR, IF YOU'VE GOT ANY JURY INSTRUCTIONS, I 
7) WANT THOSE IN WRITING. I WANT *EM AT THE PRETRIAL. IF YOU 
8) HAVE ANY QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY ON JURY SELECTION, I WANT 
9) THOSE IN WRITING. YOU DIDNT GIVE ME EITHER ONE. 
10) MR.PEDOCKIE: I DID - 1 DID HAVE A MOTION FILED MORE 
11) LESS COUNTERDICT OF WHAT MRS. NEIDER WAS SAYING IN HER JURY 
12) SELECTION OR WHATEVER. LIKE I SAID, I HAVE NO CLUE OF WHAT 
13) I'M DOING, SO -
14) THE COURT: THATS RIGHT. 
15) MR.PEDOCKIE: ~ I DON'T KNOW MEAN TO OFFEND ANYBODY -
16) THE COURT: THATS RIGHT, YOU DONT HAVE A -
17) MR.PEDOCKIE: - WHATSOEVER, BUT LIKE I SAYS, I DON'T 
18) SEE HOW WE COULD PROGRESS OR PROCEED ANY FURTHER WITHOUT ME 
19) KNOWING ANYTHING ABOUT THE LAW AND EDUCATED ENOUGH -
20) THE COURT: BUT YOU SEE, MR. PEDOCKIE, YOU'RE TRYING TO 
21) HOLD THE SYSTEM CAPTIVE, OKAY? YOU'RE TRYING TO HOLD US ALL 
22) CAPTIVE BY DRAGGING YOUR FEET. YOU DONT WANT THIS CASE TO 
23) GO TO TRIAL ~ 
24) MR. PEDOCKIE: OH, YES, I DO. 
25) THE COURT: NO, YOU DONT. YOU'VE HAD A YEAR AND A HALF 
1) TO PREPARE FOR THIS CASE, AND YOU HAVE DONE ABSOLUTELY 
2) NOTHING EXCEPT EITHER FIRE YOUR LAWYER OR THE ATTORNEY HAS 
3) ASKED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE CASE. EVERY TIME I GIVE YOU A 
4) TRIAL DATE, YOU'RE NOT READY TO PROCEED. YOU'VE NEVER BEEN 
5) READY. 
6) MR. PEDOCKIE: OH, I'VE NEVER BEEN READY? 
7) THE COURT: YOU'VE NEVER BEEN READY TO TRY THIS CASE -
8) MR. PEDOCKIE: SO ITS NOT ON RECORD THEN ONE TIME WHEN 
9) MICHAEL BOYLE WAS HERE I TOLD HIM LETS GO HE SAYS THAT HE 
10) WAS NOT READY. I SAYS -
11) THE COURT: THATS RIGHT. 
12) MR. PEDOCKIE: ~ LETS GO ON AUGUST - 1 WAS HERE ON -
13) I BELIEVE IT WAS AUGUST 1 ST OR APRIL 1ST, I'M NOT SURE 
14) BECAUSE I DO NOT HAVE NO RECORD OR TRANSCRIPTS, WHICH I'VE 
15) ASKED SEVERAL TIMES TO HAVE. AND I TOLD MR. BOYLE LETS GO 
16) AND THEN THE STATE SAYS, WELL, WE'RE NOT READY BECAUSE WE 
17) HAVE WITNESSES, DA-DA-DA-DA-DA, AND ALL THIS, AND THEN I 
18) SAYS, HEY LOOK, IF YOU'RE NOT READY, LETS POSTPONE IT. 
19) THATS NOT - YOU KNOW WHAT I MEAN? SO THATS NOT MY FAULT. 
20) THEN ON DECEMBER 10TH I'M READY TO GO AGAIN, YET MRS. NEIDER 
21) WASNT PREPARED DUE TO THE FACT, YOU KNOW, I BELIEVE IT WAS 
22) AUGUST, SHE'S THE ONE THAT SAID THE RECORD AND SCHEDULED FOR 
23) DECEMBER 10TH BECAUSE THERE WAS NO OPENINGS AVAILABLE TRIAL 
24) SOONER, BUT YET WHEN THE TIME COMES, SHE HAD A CONFLICT 
25) BECAUSE SHE HAD ANOTHER CASE TO TRIAL. WELL, HOW - YOU 
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1) KNOW, I GUESS SHE DIDN'T HAVE THIS, SO WHAT, IT JUST 
2) MAGICALLY APPEARED? OR WHY WOULD YOU DOUBLE BOOK AN 
3) INCIDENT, YOU KNOW WHAT I MEAN? AND THEN YOU FOUND GOOD 
4) CAUSE TO POSTPONE IT AGAIN. AND THEN, YES, I POSTPONED THE 
5) ONE WITH RETALLICK BECAUSE HE WASN'T DOING ANYTHING, YOU 
6) KNOW. 
7) THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ALL RIGHT. ANYTHING ELSE YOU 
8) WANNA PUT ON THE RECORD? WE GOT A JURY WAITING. 
9) MR. PEDOCKIE: YEAH, I DONT FEEL THAT THIS SHOULD 
10) PROCEED ANY FURTHER. I THINK THIS IS A MOCKRACY. SCAM AND A 
11) MOCKRACY -
12) THE COURT: OKAY. 
13) MR. PEDOCKIE: - AND THAT I'M UNABLE OF REPRESENTING 
14) MYSELF AND I'M VOKING MY SLXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT. 
15) THE COURT: OKAY. 
16) MR. PEDOCKIE: AND AS FAR AS HIM BEING NEXT TO ME, I 
17) THINK THAT WE SHOULD JUST EXCUSE HIM BECAUSE, LIKE I SAID, MY 
18) CA - CASE WORKER AND I BOTH SAT THERE AND WE WERE TOLD THAT 
19) HE DOESN'T DO NOTHING. HE'S NOT GONNA DO NOTHING. I WAS 
20) TOLD BY HIM HIMSELF THAT HE WASN'T GONNA ARGUE ANYTHING, HE 
21) WASN'T GONNA DO ANYTHING. SO WHY NOT JUST - IF IT MAKES YOU 
22) FEEL BETTER - OR THE COURTS TO FEEL BETTER, I SHOULD SAY, 
23) ABOUT VIOLING MY SDCTH - VIOLATING MY SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
24) TO HAVE HIM SIT HERE, LETS HAVE HIM SIT HERE, IF THATS WHAT 
25) YOU - MAKES YOU GUYS FEEL BETTER AROI IT VTOT TMn mrv _ 
1) VIOLATING MY SDCTH AMENDMENT RIGHT, LETS HAVE HIM SIT HERE 
2) BECAUSE I - 1 WOULD HATE TO MAKE YOU GUYS FEEL GUILTY OF 
3) VIOLATING MY SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT. 
4) THE COURT: WELL, HE'S THERE TO HELP YOU ON LEGAL 
5) ISSUES. HE'S NOT A GOPHER FOR YOU, MR. PEDOCKIE -
6) MR. PEDOCKIE: AND HE'S ALREADY TOLD ME THAT HE'S NOT 
7) GONNA ARGUE ANY MOTION -
8) THE COURT: HE'S NOT - HE'S NOT ARGUING -
9) MR. PEDOCKIE. - HE'S NOT GONNA DO ANYTHING, SO -
10) THE COURT: - FOR YOU. HE'S SIMPLY THERE TO GIVE 
11) YOU-
12) MR. PEDOCKIE: - SO THATS JUST TAKING UP THE 
13) TAXPAYERS'DOLLARS. 
14) THE COURT. OKAY. WELL, IF THATS THE WAY YOU FEEL, WHY 
15) DONT WE JUST EXCUSE MR. GRAVIS THEN AND WE'LL LET HIM GO DO 
16) SOMETHING THATS IMPORTANT -
17) MR. PEDOCKIE: YEAH. 
18) THE COURT: - OKAY? IS THAT HOW YOU FEEL? 
19) MR. PEDOCKIE: THATS HOW I FEEL. 
20) THE COURT: OKAY. ANYTHING YOU WANT TO SAY, MR. GRAVIS? 
21) I'M SURE YOU'VE GOT MORE IMPORTANT THINGS TO DO THAN SIT AND 
22) BE INSULTED BY MR PEDOCKIE ALL DAY. 
23) MS. NEIDER: JUDGE, I THINK THAT IF MR. GRAVIS COULD 
24) PROBABLY RESPOND TO HIS REQUEST FOR -
1) MS. NEIDER: - COOPERATION LAST WEEK. I THINK THAT 
2) IT'S IMPORTANT -
3) THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LETS PUT THAT ON THE RECORD 
4) THEN. 
5) MS. NEIDER: - THAT THE RECORD REFLECT THAT HE WAS NOT 
6) UNCOOPERATIVE. 
7) THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
8) MR. GRAVIS: ALL I KNOW IS THAT MELISSA TOLD ME THAT HE 
9) CALLED ON THURSDAY AND HE WAS RUDE TO THE RECEPTIONIST. THE 
10) RECEPTIONIST IS NOT EVEN IN THE SAME OFFICE BUIL DING THAT I'M 
11) IN. AND SHE HUNG UP ON HIM. AND THEN HE CALLED FRIDAY ABOUT 
12) 2:15 WANTING SUBPOENAS. I WASN'T THERE, SO I DON'T - BUT 
13) SHE JUST TOLD HIM IT WAS TOO LATE. THAT WAS NO WAY WE COULD 
14) GET SUBPOENAS OUT AND GET TiM SERVED. 
15) THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO THIS CALL CAME FRIDAY YOU SAY 
16) ABOUT 2:15? 
17) MR. GRAVIS: THAT'S WHAT MELISSA TOLD ME. 
18) THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND DID YOU HAVE ADDRESSES FROM 
19) HIM AS FAR AS WHERE TO SEND THESE SUBPOENAS? 
20) MR. GRAVIS: NO. I DON'T KNOW IF HE HAD ADDRESSES ON 
21) FRIDAY, BUT HE - IN OTHER DATES I'VE ASKED HIM FOR ADDRESSES 
22) OR PHONE NUMBERS, AND THE ONLY NAMES I'VE GOTTEN IS PEOPLE 
23) THE STATE'S ALREADY SUBPOENAED. 
24) THE COURT: OKAY. 
25) MR.PEDOCKJJE: I HAVE SEVERAL OTHER WITNESS, AND ALSO, 
1) OFFICER AND A CASEWORKER. WE'LL HAVE - WE COULD HAVE HIM 
2) SUBPOENAED. BUT THEN AGAIN, I DO NOT KNOW HOW TO SUBPOENA 
3) ANYBODY, SO HOW WOULD WE BE ABLE TO GO ABOUT THIS, YOU KNOW? 
4) LIKE I SAID, I JUST - 1 DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW WE'RE GONNA 
5) PROCEED ANY FURTHER WITHOUT ANY WITNESSES IN MY BEHALF AND -
6) THE COURT: THAT'S TRUE. THAT'S YOUR PROBLEM, SIR -
7) MR.PEDOCKIE: I MEAN ITS - ITS JUST. 
8) THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYTHING ELSE YOU WANNA PUT ON 
9) THE RECORD, MR. GRAVIS? 
10) MR. GRAVIS: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
11) THE COURT: STATE HAVE ANY -
12) MS. NEIDER: JUDGE, I THINK - 1 THINK JUST A LITTLE 
13) MORE COLLOQUY WITH MR. PEDOCKIE ABOUT THE DANGERS AND 
14) DISADVANTAGES OF PROCEEDING WITHOUT MR. GRAVIS TO HELP HIM AT 
15) A L L -
16) THE COURT: OKAY. 
17) MS. NEIDER: - I THINK WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. 
18) THE COURT: YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? HE IS TRAINED IN THE 
19) LAW. HE CAN HELP YOU ON THE LAW, THE LEGAL ISSUES HERE, 
20) ABOUT THE VOIR DIRE, ABOUT THE JURY SELECTION, ABOUT THE JURY 
21) INSTRUCTIONS, ABOUT CROSS-EXAMINATION, THERE'S A NUMBER OF 
22) ISSUES THAT HE COULD HELP YOU WITH ON THIS CASE. HE DOESN'T 
23) REPRESENT YOU, BUT HE CERTAINLY CAN GIVE YOU ADVICE. 
24) MR. PEDOCKIE: RIGHT NOW, YOUR HONOR, I DON'T BELIEVE 
25} ANYTHING COULD HELP ME BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT YOU GUYS ARE 
1) YOUR HONOR, THE REASON WHY I DID NOT WANNA PROCEED WITH HIS 
2) QUESTIONS FOR THE JURORS IS BECAUSE I SAT IN THE ROOM RIGHT 
3) THERE RIGHT NEXT TO HIM. I ASKED HTM HOW HE FEELS ABOUT MY 
4) CASE, AND HE SAYS, TO BE HONEST, I HAVE NOT READ MY - 1 HAVE 
5) NOT READ YOUR CASE. WELL, HOW COULD I FEEL CONFIDENT OF AN 
6) INDIVIDUAL THATS PUT FORTH ANY EFFORT THAT HASN'T READ MY 
7) CASE? 
8) THE COURT: BECAUSE HE'S NOT REPRESENTING YOU, S I R -
9) MR. PEDOCKIE: I KNOW, BUT HE'S -
10) THE COURT: - HE'S COME TODAY TO ADVISE YOU -
11) MR. PEDOCKIE: I KNOW, BUT HOW WOULD HE KNOW WHAT 
12) QUESTIONS TO PRESENT TO JURORS? 
13) THE COURT: HE DOESNT - HE'S NOT QUESTIONING ANY OF 
14) THE JURORS. YOU'RE REPRESENTING YOURSELF. HEISSIMPLV WHAT 
15) WE CALL STANDBY COUNSEL HE'S THERE TO GIVE YOU ADVICE ON 
16) LEGAL ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, HOW TO SELECT A JURY, WHO TO TAKE 
17) OFF ON THE JURY. THATS WHAT HE'S THERE FOR. 
18) MR. PEDOCKIE: AND ON THE 18TH, YOU TOLD ME THAT I HAD 
19) TO GO THROUGH MR. GRAVIS TO GET ALL THESE TRANSCRIPTS, BUT 
20) YET, NOW, WHEN I TRY TO GO THROUGH HIM, THEY'RE TRYING TO 
21) TELL ME - AND ITS NOT JUST BEEN THE THURSDAY AND FRIDAY 
22) I'VE CALLED HIM. AND IN FACT, MY CASEWORKER HAS A WRITTEN 
23) STATEMENT AND WOULD BE MORE THAN WILLING TO COME AND TESTIFY 
24) IN MY BEHALF THAT I HAVE CALLED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, AND WE 
25) DO HAVE PHONE RECORDS. WE HAVE HIM. HE'S A CORRECTIONAL 
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1) RAILROADING ME. I THINK THAT WEBER STATE'S RAILROADING ME 
2) AND VIOLATING MY RIGHTS. AND HOW IN THE HECK DO YOU EXPECT 
3) SOMEBODY WITH NO EDUCATION IN THE LAW - LIKE I TOLD YOU, I'M 
4) NOT EDUCATED NOR FAMILIAR WITH THE RULES AND PROCEEDINGS 
5) AND I D O N T EVEN KNOW HOW MANY CHALLENGES I CAN GET. AND I 
6) DONT KNOW HOW TO EVEN CROSS-EXAMINE A WITNESS -
7) THE COURT: THATS RIGHT. 
8) MR. PEDOCKIE: - LET ALONE ANYTHING ELSE. AND YOU'RE 
9) EXPECTING ME TO GET A FAIR TRIAL? LIKE I SAID, I'M NOT 
10) TRYING TO BE OFFENSIVE TO ANYBODY, BUT I JUST THINK - THINK 
11) THAT ITS - YOU KNOW WHAT I MEAN -
12) THE COURT. BUT YOU SEE, YOU CREATED THIS SITUATION 
13) MR. PEDOCKIE-
14) MR. PEDOCKIE: THATS WHAT YOU KEEP TELLING ME, YOUR 
15) H O N O R -
16) THE COURT: AND THERE'S NO DOUBT IN MY MIND, SIR, YOU'RE 
17) FAR MORE INTELLIGENT THAN YOU WANT ME TO BELIEVE. EVERY TIME 
18) WE GOT READY TO TRY THIS CASE, THE LAST FOUR TIMES, YOU'VE 
19) FIRED YOUR ATTORNEY JUST BEFORE TRIAL. AND THATS A 
20) DELIBERATE ACT ON YOUR PART TO TRY TO STALL OUT THIS TRIAL 
21) PROCEEDING. 
22) MR PEDOCKIE: AND LIKE I SAID, IF WE GO AND PULL UP THE 
23) RECORDS, YOUR HONOR, I WAS READY ON AUGUST 1ST -
24) THE COURT: YEAH. 
25^ MR PFDOrinF- - ANn THFM ROVT V WA W T T WAS RFADY ON 
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1) DECEMBER 10TH CAMILLE NEIDER WASN'T I'D-I'D LIKE TO 
2) HAVE THIS GO TO TRIAL AS MUCH AS YOU GUYS WOULD DO YOU 
3) THINK THAT I - MY MOTHER JUST HAD BRAIN SURGERY, IS IN THE 
4) U OFU AND DO YOU THINK THAT ID MUCH RATHER SIT HERE WITH 
5) YOU GUYS THAN BE ABLE TO GO OUT THERE? I'D RATHER HAVE THIS 
6) OVER WITH AND DONE WITH AND BE ABLE TO MOVE ON WITH MY LIFE 
7) THAN SIT HERE AND ARGUE WITH YOU GUYS ABOUT THIS SITUATION, 
8) YOU KNOW LIKE I SAID, MY - MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS HAVE 
9) BEEN VIOLATED, NOT JUST ONCE, BUT MANY TIMES AND I'M -
10) LIKE I SAID, I'M VOKING MY RIGHT FOR COUNSEL AT THIS TIME 
11) ALSO 
12) THE COURT ALL RIGHT WELL, I THINK WE'VE PUT THAT ON 
13) THE RECORD AND I'VE TOLD YOU THERE'S SOME REAL DISADVANTAGES 
14) TO REPRESENTING YOURSELF THERE'S SOME REAL DISADVANTAGES TO 
15) NOT LISTENING TO MR GRAVIS IN THIS CASE, BUT APPARENTLY THIS 
16) IS WHAT YOU WANNA DO YOU DIDNT WANT MR GRAVIS -
17) MR PEDOCKJE NO, THIS IS NOT WHAT I WANNA DO I'D 
18) LIKE TO HAVE ATTORNEY IT) LIKE TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY -
19) THE COURT WHAT, SO YOU CAN FIRE HIM AGAIN? 
20) MR PEDOCKIE - TO HAVE MY BEST WISHES AND MY 
21) INTERESTS -
22) THE COURT SO YOU CAN FTRE HIM AGAIN LIKE YOU HAVE 
23) EVERYBODY ELSE? 
24) MR PEDOCKIE NO, I WOULD NOT FIRE HIM 
25) THE COURT RIGHT OKAY ALL RIGHT ANYTHING ELSE WE 
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1) AND ALSO IS REPRESENTING HIMSELF IN THIS CASE FOLKS, THIS 
2) IS A CRIMINAL CASE THE DEFENDANT IS CHARGED IN THIS MATTER 
3) WITH AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING ITS ALLEGED TO HAVE OCCURRED 
4) BACK IN JANUARY OF LAST YEAR, JANUARY 2ND AND 3RD THE 
5) ALLEGED VICTIM IN THIS CASE IS - IS IT JEANETTE SATHER? 
6) MS NEIDER SATHER, JUDGE 
7) THE COURT SATHER 
8) MS NEIDER SHE GOES BY NICOLE 
9) THE COURT NICOLE ALL RIGHT NICOLE SATHER ALL 
10) RIGHT AND DOES BOTH PARTIES HAVE A LIST OF ALL OF THE 
11) JURORS? 
12) MS NEIDER I DO, JUDGE 
13) THE COURT ALL RIGHT MR PEDOCKIE, DID YOU HAVE A 
14) LIST OF THE JURORS? 
15) MR PEDOCKIE YES, YOUR HONOR 
16) THE COURT ALL RIGHT FOLKS, WE NEED TO HAVE EVERYBODY 
17) STAND AND RAISE YOUR RIGHT HAND YOU'LL HAVE TO TAKE AN OATH 
18) BEFORE WE BEGIN 
19) (THE CLERK ADMINISTERED AN OATH TO THE JURORS ) 
20) THE COURT ALL RIGHT YOU MAY BE SEATED THEREIN 
21) FRONT OF YOU SHOULD BE A LIST OF ABOUT 20 QUESTIONS AND THE 
22) FIRST THING WE HAVE TO DO IN THIS MATTER IS SELECT A JURY 
23) FROM YOUR NUMBERS WE'RE GONNA SEAT ACTUALLY NINE JURORS TO 
24) HEAR THE CASE SO WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO DO, WE'LL START WITH 
1) WANNA PUT ON THE RECORD, MR GRAVIS'' 
2) MR GRAVIS NO, YOUR HONOR 
3) THE COURT ANYTHING ELSE FROM THE STATE? 
4) MS NEIDER NO, JUDGE 
5) THE COURT ALL RIGHT I'M GONNA RELEASE MR GRAVIS 
6) THEN 
7) MR GRAVIS THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
8) MR PEDOCKIE AND I'D LIKE TO HAVE IT ON RECORD THAT I 
9) DIDN'T VOLUNTARILY, BUT I'D LIKE TO HAVE COUNSEL HERE, BUT 
10) SOMEBODY THAT HAS MY BEST INTERESTS -
11) THE COURT OKAY 
12) MR PEDOCKIE - AT STAKE INSTEAD OF SOMEBODY THAT'S 
13) NOT GONNA ARGUE ANYTHING OR SAY ANYTHING IN MY BEHALF 
14) THE COURT NOW, LETS HAVE THE ATTORNEYS ~ OR THE 
15) PARTIES, YOU CAN MOVE ON THIS SIDE BECAUSE THE JURY'S GONNA 
16) BE OUT HERE IN THE AUDIENCE, SO IF YOU WANNA MOVE MR 
17) PEDOCKIE AROUND ON THIS SIDE 
18) ALL RIGHT LETS BRING IN THE JURY THEN 
19) (THE JURY ENTERS THE COURTROOM ) 
20) THE COURT ALL RIGHT LETS HAVE THE RECORD REFLECT 
21) THIS IS THE MATTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH VERSUS ROBERT 
22) PEDOCKIE ITS CASE 0689 STATE IS PRESENT AND REPRESENTED 
23) BY MS NEIDER? 
24) MS NEIDER YES, JUDGE 
25) THE COURT AND THE DEFENDANT, MR PEDOCKIE, IS PRESENT 
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1) NAME"> 
2) A JUROR BOLLOM, JUST LIKE BOTTOM, YOU DON T CROSS THE 
3) TS 
4) THE COURT BOTTOM, ALL RIGHT WHAT ID LIKE TO HAVE 
5) YOU DO IS STAND AND ANSWER EACH OF THOSE QUESTIONS FOR US 
6) AND I MIGHT INDICATE, ITS VERY HELPFUL JUST BECAUSE WE HAVE 
7) A COURT REPORTER AND EVERYTHING S ON THE RECORD THAT WHEN YOU 
8) RESPOND TO ANY QUESTION, IF YOU WOULD STAND, GIVE ME YOUR 
9) NAME AND WHAT JUROR NUMBER YOU ARE, JUST SO WE CAN KEEP TRACK 
10) OF EVERYBODY OKAY GO AHEAD 
11) A JUROR RALPH BOLLOM, NUMBER ONE 
12) THE COURT OKAY AND DO YOU HAVE THAT LIST OF 
13) QUESTIONS THERE IN FRONT OF YOU1* 
14) A JUROR YES 
15) THE COURT ALL RIGHT IF YOUD JUST GO DOWN THE LIST 
16) THERE AND ANSWER EACH ONE OF THOSE FOR US 
17) A JUROR WELL, I RESIDE IN THE COUNTY OF WEBER, WHICH 
18) IS ~ MY MAILING ADDRESS IS HUNTSVILLE 
19) THE COURT OKAY 
20) A JUROR I'VE LIVED IN UTAH FOUR 17 YEARS I HAVE 
21) LIVED IN OTHER STATES WISCONSIN I WAS IN WISCONSIN AND 
22) LIVED 35 YEARS IN CALIFORNIA IM WIDOWED I DON'T HAVE ANY 
23) CHILDREN MY OFFICIAL TITLE OR OCCUPATION IS R ANDD 
24) TECHNICIAN AND I HAVE WORKED FOR MY EMPLOYER FOR 14 YEARS 
